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Advisory Adjudication 
Girardeau A. Spann* 
The Supreme Court dedsion in Camreta v. Greene is revealing. The Court firSt issues an 
opinion authorizing appeals by prevailing parties in qualified immunity cases, even though 
doing so entails the issuance of an advisory opinion that is not necessmy to resolution of the 
dispute between the parties. And the Court then declines to reach the ments of the underlying 
constitutional claim in the case, because doing so would entail the issuance of an advisory 
opinion that oos not necessmy to the resolution of the dispute between the parties. The Court's 
decision, therefore, has the paradoxical efkct of both hononng and violating the Article 11! 
junsdictionallimitation on adVIsOiy opi"nions at the same time. The Camreta paradox illustrates 
a problem that makes our current conception ofjudicial review incoherent I* insist that the 
Supreme Court avoid separation of powers problems by confimng itself to the retrospective 
acfiudicatory actiVIties envisioned by the Marbury v. Madison dispute-resolution model of 
judicial reVIew. But what we really want the Court to do IS participate In the prospective 
!Onnulation of govemmental policy, as if it were part of a tncamerallegislative process. These 
dual conceptions ofjudicia/ reVI·ew reflect a tension inherent 1n liberalism itself We want both 
to advance our own self-interests in an unflattering pluralist political process, but simultaneously 
we wish to think of ourselves as other-regarding adherents to Jollier civic republican virtue. ~ 
ask the Supreme Court to mediate this tension !Or us by malang our liberal political victories 
look as if they are rooted in deeper communitarian principles. But this mediation can be 
successfUl only to the extent that the Court can mask !Or us the underlying incoherence of the 
judicial review limction that we ask the Court to ped"onn. In Carnreta, this incoherence is so 
close to the swface that, hopefUlly, we will be forced to confivnt it Without the camouflage that 
we ask judiCial review to proVIde !Or our baser instincts, perhaps we Will come to treat each 
other Jess harshly, and with more empathy 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Sometimes a United States Supreme Court decision is 
reminiscent of a Robert Frost poem. It starts out by focusing on a 
particular incident, but ends up prompting an insight about some larger 
truth. 1 That is the way I felt about the Supreme Court's recent decision 
in Camreta v. Greene.2 The decision starts out by addressing a dispute 
between the parties, but ends up prompting a larger insight about the 
nature of judicial review. The insight is that the institution of judicial 
review is largely incoherent. 
In Camreta, government officials interviewed a nine-year-old 
elementary school girl in an effort to determine whether she was being 
sexually abused by her father. Her mother then sued the officials for 
damages, claiming that the interview violated her daughter's Fourth 
Amendment rights. The government prevailed in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit when that court found that the 
government officials were protected by qualified immunity. The 
curious Supreme Court decision that followed was issued not at the 
behest of the mother who had lost below, but at the behest of the 
prevailing government officials who preferred to win on the merits of 
the Fourth Amendment issue. But after holding that the Article III 
prohibition on advisory opinions did not preclude the Court from 
granting the request of the officials for prospective Fourth Amendment 
guidance, the Court nevertheless dismissed the appeal under Article III 
asmooe 
If an advisory opinion is understood in its conventional sense as 
the adjudication of a legal issue that is not necessary for resolution of 
the dispute between the parties, the Supreme Court decision in 
I. For example, the well-known Robert Frost poem Stopping by Woods on a Snowy 
Evem'ng, which many of us first encountered as schoolchildren, begins by describing the 
seemingly innocuous incident referred to in the poem's title, but ends up prompting an insight 
about the nature of life itself. See Robert Frost, Stopping by Wood5 on a Snowy Evening, in 
THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 224-25 (Edward Connery Lathem ed., 1969). 
2. 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011). 
3. See id at 2027-29, 2033-34. 
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Camreta is quite remarkable. In essence, the Supreme Court issued an 
advisory opinion holding that it had jurisdiction to review advisory 
opinions that were issued by lower courts in qualified immunity cases. 
But after having done so, the Court seemingly went on to hold that the 
Article III prohibition on advisory opinions prevented the Court from 
issuing the very advisory opinion that the Court itself had just issued. 
This dizzying self-referential paradox is more than just puzzling. It 
prompts the insight that judicial review cannot actually serve the 
constitutional function that we have traditionally envisioned for it. 
Under our tripartite system of government, we normally think 
that the Supreme Court is institutionally competent to resolve concrete 
disputes between the parties. However, the very insulation from 
political accountability that is commonly thought to make the life-
tenured federal judiciary a trustworthy arbiter of individual disputes 
also leaves it institutionally ill-suited to the formulation of prospective 
governmental policy. To avoid this countermajoritarian difficulty, we 
therefore allocate such legislative policy-making functions to the 
politically accountable branches of government. Consistent with our 
commitment to separation of powers, the Article III-based prohibition 
on advisory opinions is intended to confine the practice of judicial 
review to the dispute-resolution arena and to prevent it from seeping 
into the realm of legislative policy making. This constitutional 
aversion to advisory opinions is traceable to the model of judicial 
review articulated in Marbwy v. Madison.4 But the Marbwy model 
has become so porous that it is unrealistic to believe that it can actually 
prevent judicial review from infiltrating the policy-making process. 
And there is a reason for that. 
Article III considerations aside, we have never really viewed the 
Supreme Court as a dispute-resolution body. From the Marshall 
Court's Commerce Clause decisions addressing the scope of federal 
power/ to the Roberts Court's campaign finance decisions addressing 
the scope of corporate power,6 we have always expected the Supreme 
Court to engage in prospective social policy-making activities 
concerning controversial political issues. Indeed, our reliance on the 
Court to resolve stubborn social policy issues has become so prevalent 
that the Court can plausibly be viewed as the final policy-making 
chamber of a tricameral legislature-a chamber whose members 
simply have longer terms of office than other officials, and whose 
4. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). 
5. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824). 
6. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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constituents simply prefer their policy preferences to be articulated as 
outgrowths of foundational principles. Accordingly, the concurrence 
of the Court-like the concurrence of the House, the Senate, and 
typically the President-is required before social policies affecting 
issues such as school prayer, abortion, and affirmative action can take 
effect. The fact that judicial policy making is clothed in the garb of 
constitutional adjudication, addressed to particular disputes between 
particular parties, does not negate the fact that Supreme Court 
decisions are useful primarily for their general, prospective effect. We 
affirmatively want the Supreme Court to issue advisory opinions so 
that we can rely on the policies advanced by those opinions to order 
our everyday lives-just as we rely on the policies advanced by other 
conventional legislative enactments to give us prospective guidance. 
The Camreta decision exemplifies the incompatible demands that 
we make on judicial review. Realizing that separation of powers 
concerns limit legitimate adjudication to the retrospective resolution of 
particular cases and controversies, the Court invokes the doctrine of 
mootness to refrain from issuing an advisory opinion in a dispute that 
it no longer views as live.7 But realizing that the value of judicial 
review lies precisely in its prospective policy prescriptions, the Court 
issues an advisory opinion "holding" that the Court has jurisdiction to 
issue advisory opinions when the need for prospective guidance is 
sufficiently high.8 Then, as if to dispel the suspicion that Camreta 
might be an isolated anomaly, the Supreme Court went on to issue 
other advisory opinions during the same Term.9 
Don't get me wrong. I am not suggesting that the Supreme Court 
should choose one model of judicial review and simply stick to it. 10 On 
7. SeeCamreta, 131 S.Ct.at2033-34. 
8. See 1d at 2029. 
9. See in/ro Part II.B. 
I 0. In my youth, I did suggest that the Supreme Court should adopt an "expository" 
model of judicial review that would provide the culture with advice about the operative 
meaning of its fundamental values at particular points in the culture's evolution. See 
Girardeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 585, 585-87 (1983). I have since 
become less sanguine about the expository benefits of judicial review. See, e.g., GIRARDEAU 
A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT & MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICA 1-6 (1993) (suggesting that one function of the Supreme Court is to facilitate the 
oppression of racial minorities). However, I continue to believe that the primary effects of 
judicial review are intended to be prospective rather than retrospective, see Spann, supra, at 
613-17, although I no longer view the supposed distinction between judicial exposition and 
legislative policy making as viable. Cf. id at 635-36. For an example of a commentator who 
continues to take the Marbury model very seriously-along with the model's prohibition on 
unnecessary advisory opinions in constitutional cases, including cases that involve qualified 
immunity-see Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. 
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the contrary, my point is that our sincere expectations for judicial 
review are themselves internally inconsistent. We want the Court to 
formulate prospective social policy for us, but simultaneously to 
convince us that it is merely applying the Constitution in a 
retrospective, nonpartisan way. There is an advantage in asking 
judicial review to serve this dual function. 
Reflecting a dilemma inherent in liberalism, we are often 
confronted with the conflict that exists between our liberal inclinations 
to pursue pure self-interest through a commitment to pluralist politics, 
and our other-regarding inclinations to pursue collective welfare 
through a commitment to classical republican civic virtue. 11 One way 
to help mediate this conflict is by asking the Supreme Court to do it for 
us. When the Court rules in our favor, it enables us to believe that the 
pluralist special interests we successfully lobby the Court to adopt in 
its tricameral policy-making capacity are actually rooted in the 
republican constitutional principles that the Court announces in its 
adjudicatory dispute-resolution capacity. These dual functions of 
judicial review can help us advance our own interests at the expense of 
others, while believing that we are doing something that is 
constitutionally noble rather than something that is selfishly political. 
However, judicial review can successfully serve this dual function only 
to the extent that we can suppress our own recognition of what is going 
on. 
I think that cases like Camreta are useful precisely because they 
put enough strain on the Marbwy-based adjudicatory model of judicial 
review to challenge our continued adherence to that model. When we 
adopt social policies that advance our own self-interests at the expense 
of others, simply because we possess the political power to sacrifice 
those other interests for our own well-being, we should at least 
recognize that this is what we are doing. If we can come to appreciate 
the incoherence produced by the conflicting demands that we place on 
judicial review, my hope is that we will no longer make the mistake of 
thinking that judicial review can somehow save us from the 
implications of our own parochial policy preferences. 
Part II of this Article describes the doctrinal difficulties that are 
embedded in the Supreme Court's Camreta dalliance with advisory 
opinions. Part II.A discusses the doctrinal paradox created by the 
REV. 847, 848-58, 935-36 (2005) (arguing that the current trend toward increased advisory 
opinions has the effect of increasing judicial power). 
11. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 19-21, 24-29 (6th ed. 
2009). 
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Camreta Court's application of the advisory opinion rule. Part II.B 
discusses other advisory opinions issued the same Term that implicate 
the Camreta paradox. Part III describes the manner in which 
Camreta's doctrinal difficulties reflect the inconsistent demands that 
we place on the conventional model of judicial review. Part liLA 
discusses the constitutional underpinning of the adjudicatory model of 
judicial review that emanates from Marbmy v. Madison. Part III.B 
argues that, despite the constraints of the Marbmymodel, we still favor 
prospective judicial policy making as part of what amounts to a 
tricameral legislative process. Part N considers why we remain 
attracted to the Marbmy model of judicial review, despite the elusive 
distinction that exists between retrospective judicial adjudication and 
prospective legislative policy making. Part IY.A suggests that our 
adherence to the Marbmy model reflects the liberal dilemma inherent 
in our efforts to be both self-interested and other-regarding. Part IY.B 
argues that by appreciating rather than suppressing the incoherence of 
the Marbmymodel, we may evolve to a postliberal stage of evolution 
in which we are better able to accept accountability for the policies that 
we impose on one another. The Conclusion, however, fears that the 
convenient insulation from accountability that is offered by the 
safeguard of judicial review may be so appealing that we will simply 
deflect any insights about the incoherence of the conventional model 
with which we are confronted. 
II. ADVISORY OPINIONS 
The Article III limitation of federal court jurisdiction to "Cases" 
and "Controversies" has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to 
prohibit the issuance of advisory opinions. 12 An advisory opinion has, 
in turn, been held to entail the adjudication of an issue whose 
resolution is not necessary to settle a dispute between the parties. 13 In 
Camreta v. Greene, the Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion that 
was not necessary to settle a dispute between the parties, and it did so 
12. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94, 96 (1968); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. 
ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 50-54 (6th 
ed. 2009); STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES 
113-48 (1997); Spann, supra note 10, at 589-90, 617, 632-35; Note, Advis01y Opinions and 
the Influence of the Supreme Cowt over Amencan Policymaking, 124 HARV. L. REv. 2064, 
2066-69 (20 11 ). 
13. See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 50-54, 70-73 (discussing the link 
between the prohibition of advisory opinions and the dispute-resolution model of judicial 
review); see also Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945) (emphasizing necessity to 
decision). 
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in a case that the Court went on to hold it lacked Article III jurisdiction 
to review. 14 Whether or not two wrongs can ever make a right, in this 
instance two wrongs did make a paradox. The Court both issued and 
refused to issue an advisory opinion in the same case. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court's advisory opinion problem is not limited to Camreta 
alone. Other decisions issued by the Court that same Term illustrate-
and even require-the issuance of advisory opinions in seeming 
violation of the Article III prohibition. 
A. Camreta Paradox 
The dispute before the Court in Camreta involved contested 
claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of alleged 
constitutional violations, and pendant claims for damages arising out 
of state tort law violations. In the process of resolving that dispute, the 
United States District Court for the District of Oregon, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court 
all issued opinions that were in increasingly greater tension with the 
Article III prohibition on advisory opinions. 
1. Factual Context 
After a nine-year-old girl referred to as "S.G." was interviewed in 
an Oregon elementary school by public officials, S.G.'s mother Sarah 
filed a damage action asserting that the interview violated a variety of 
constitutional and state law tort rights possessed by S.G. and her 
family. Most prominent among these was the Fourth Amendment right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, which Sarah 
claimed had been violated when S.G. was interviewed without a 
warrant, probable cause, exigent circumstances, or parental consent. 15 
The reason S.G. had been interviewed was that Oregon state and 
county officials feared that S.G. and her five-year-old sister K.G. were 
being sexually abused by their father Nimrod. Nimrod had been 
arrested on February 12, 2003, for suspected sexual abuse of an 
unrelated seven-year-old boy referred to as "F.S." In connection with 
that arrest, the parents of F.S. reported that Sarah herself was 
concerned about Nimrod's potential sexual abuse of their own 
14. See 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011). 
15. The Supreme Court briefly discussed the facts in Camreta. Id at 2027-28. A 
fuller discussion of the facts is set out in the court of appeals opinion, Greene v. Camreta 
(Greene I I), 588 F.3d 1011, 1016-20 (9th Cir. 2009), and the district court opinion, Greene v. 
Camreta (Greene 1), No. Civ. 05-6047-AA, 2006 WL 758547, at *1-2 (D. Or. Mar. 23, 
2006). 
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children, S.G. and K.G. As part of the ensuing investigation, S.G. was 
interviewed on February 24, 2003, by Oregon Department of Human 
Services Child Protective Services caseworker Camreta, in the 
presence of Deschutes County Deputy Sheriff Alford. The two-hour 
interview was conducted while S.G. was at school, in the apparent 
hope of getting S.G. to speak freely in the absence of her parents. 
During the interview, S.G. initially denied that her father had abused 
her, but she eventually stated that her father did sometimes touch her in 
inappropriate ways while he was intoxicated. Subsequent to that 
interview, however, S.G. recanted. S.G. stated that she felt 
uncomfortable and intimidated during the interview and that she told 
Camreta what she thought he wanted to hear in order to be allowed to 
leave. 16 
On March 6, 2003, S.G.'s father Nimrod was indicted for six 
counts of felony sexual assault against F.S. and S.G.17 At the close of 
Nimrod's trial for sexual assault against F.S. and S.G., the jury failed to 
reach a verdict. In lieu of a retrial, Nimrod accepted an Alford plea 
with respect to the charges concerning F.S., and the charges 
concerning his daughter S.G. were dismissed. 18 Sarah then filed an 
action in federal district court against a variety of defendants, 
including caseworker Camreta and Deputy Alford. Sarah sued on 
behalf of herself and her daughters S.G. and K.G. She alleged 
unconstitutional and state tort law interference with their collective 
familial rights, as well as unconstitutional interference with S.G.'s 
Fourth Amendment rights. Nimrod did not sue. 19 
2. Lower Courts 
The district court rejected Sarah's claims on the merits and 
entered summary judgment for defendants Camreta and Alford.20 The 
district court also held that Camreta and Alford were entitled to 
qualified immunity even if their interview ofS.G. could be viewed as a 
Fourth Amendment violation. Qualified immunity was available, 
16. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2027; Greene II, 588 F.3d at 1016-17; Greene I, 2006 
WL 758547, at*l-2. 
17. See Greene II, 588 F.3d at 1018; Greene I, 2006 WL 758547, at *2. 
18. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2027; Greene II, 588 F.3d at 1020. An Alford plea 
maintains innocence, but admits the existence of sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. 
See Greene II, 588 F.3d at 1020 n.3 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)). 
This "Alford" bears no relation to Deputy Sheriff Alford in Camreta. 
19. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2027; Greene II, 588 F.3d at 1020; Greene I, 2006 WL 
758547, at * 1-9 (discussing constitutional and state tort law claims). 
20. See Greene I, 2006 WL 758547, at *1-9. 
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notwithstanding a hypothetical violation of the Fourth Amendment, 
because no law clearly established that the interview was 
impermissible, and reasonable officials could have believed that such 
an interview was lawful.21 
In theory, the district court opinion could be said to pose an 
advisory opinion problem. Either the court's Fourth Amendment 
adjudication or its qualified immunity adjudication could technically 
be viewed as an impermissible advisory opinion. Because either was 
alone sufficient to dispose of the damage claim at issue, the court's 
resolution of the other issue was arguably unnecessary to settle the 
dispute between the parties. However, alternative holdings adjudicated 
by lower courts are not typically viewed as impermissible advisory 
opinions.22 Perhaps this is because both holdings are potentially 
necessary to the court's decision. If a lower court is later reversed on 
one issue by an appellate court, the alternative holding can still serve 
as a basis for affirming the lower court judgment. Therefore, 
considerations of judicial economy in resolving the dispute between 
the parties might justify any technical incursion on the advisory 
opinion rule that would otherwise be of concern. If this view is 
accepted, all of the issues that the district court addressed fall within an 
expansive understanding of what was necessary to resolve the disputed 
damage claim. Moreover, the district court was careful to deny those 
motions that it deemed to be moot, thereby further avoiding any 
additional advisory opinion problems.23 
From an advisory opinion perspective, the decision of the court 
of appeals was far more problematic. The appeal to that court had 
been filed by Sarah, who lost in the district court below, and the court 
of appeals reversed the district court on the merits of Sarah's Fourth 
Amendment claim. The court of appeals held that the interview of 
S.G. at school was so entangled with the ongoing criminal 
investigation of Nimrod that conducting the interview without Fourth 
Amendment protections constituted an unreasonable seizure.24 
However, the court of appeals ultimately affirmed the district court 
judgment granting qualified immunity to Camreta and Alford, because 
21. See id. at *4-5. 
22. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2040-49 
(1994). 
23. See Greene I, 2006 WL 758547, at *9 (denying motion to strike). 
24. See Greene II, 588 F.3d at 1021-30. 
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it agreed that the Fourth Amendment law prohibiting S.G.'s interview 
was not clearly established at the time that the interview occurred.25 
Like the district court, the court of appeals adjudicated both the 
merits of the Fourth Amendment claim and the availability of the 
qualified immunity defense. Unlike the district court, however, the 
court of appeals could not maintain that it was merely issuing 
alternative holdings. Affirming the district court judgment on 
qualified immunity grounds completely resolved the dispute between 
the parties. And the court's additional decision upholding the Fourth 
Amendment claim could not have been an alternative holding because 
it did not support the court's judgment. That judgment reyectedSarah's 
damage claim, and the Fourth Amendment ruling provided a basis for 
upholding the claim. As a result, the Fourth Amendment ruling issued 
by the court of appeals was a pure advisory opinion, issued for reasons 
other than resolving the dispute between the parties. In the words of 
the Ninth Circuit itself, the Fourth Amendment decision was issued "to 
provide guidance to those charged with the difficult task of protecting 
child welfare within the confines of the Fourth Amendment," because 
"although other circuits have provided guidance to parents, school 
officials, social workers, and law enforcement personnel on the issue, 
we have not."26 
In fairness to the court of appeals, it was not breaking new 
ground by adjudicating the Fourth Amendment claim. Rather, its 
adjudication of that claim had been expressly authorized by the 
Supreme Court.27 In fact, the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in 
Saucier v. Katz actually required lower courts to adjudicate the merits 
of the constitutional claims asserted in qualified immunity cases, in 
order to promote "the law's elaboration from case to case."28 The 
Court's more recent 2009 decision in Pearson v. Callahan now gives 
lower courts discretion in deciding whether to resolve the 
constitutional issues presented in such cases.29 But Pearson still 
authorizes the issuance of advisory opinions. 
This Supreme Court authorization was designed to solve a 
particular, practical problem. If the advisory opinion rule were strictly 
applied in qualified immunity cases, there would rarely be an occasion 
25. Sec:Jd at 1030-33. 
26. /d at 1021-22. 
27. See 1d 
28. 533 U.S. 194,201 (2001); see a/soCamreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020,2031-32 
(2011). 
29. 555 u.s. 223 (2009). 
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for a federal court to resolve the merits of a novel constitutional claim. 
Recognition of qualified immunity would preclude the court from 
addressing the novel claim the first time it was raised, which in turn 
would prevent the claim from becoming "clearly established" enough 
to override a qualified immunity claim in the next case that considered 
it. This process would go on indefinitely, in a way that left government 
officials without the constitutional guidance needed to prevent them 
from repeatedly violating novel but valid constitutional rights.30 
Because the rights would never become sufficiently established to 
penetrate the qualified immunity defense, the development of 
constitutional law would remain "permanently in limbo."3' The lower 
courts, therefore, had the Supreme Court's blessing in issuing their 
Fourth Amendment advisory opinions. But the Supreme Court's own 
advisory opinion in Camreta is considerably more difficult to fathom. 
3. Supreme Court 
One of the most noteworthy features of the Supreme Court 
decision in Camreta is that it was issued at the behest of the parties 
who prevailed in the court of appeals, and not at the behest of the party 
who lost. Although Sarah's damage claim was rejected by the Ninth 
Circuit on qualified immunity grounds, Sarah did not seek review of 
that decision. Instead, the Supreme Court granted review based on 
petitions for certiorari that were filed by Camreta and Alford-the 
prevailing officials who had conducted the in-school interview of S.G. 
Those officials wanted to win on the merits of the Fourth Amendment 
issue, rather than simply on qualified immunity grounds, because they 
wanted to establish the constitutional validity of such in-school 
interviews in order to guide their actions in future cases.32 The 
petitioners, therefore, were expressly asking the Supreme Court to 
issue an advisory opinion. 
The Supreme Court held that Article III did not prohibit 
prevailing parties from obtaining such advisory opinions. Writing for 
a five-Justice majority, Justice Kagan stated that an immunized official 
could still possess an interest in the outcome of a litigated issue. She 
also cited two precedents in support of the proposition that appeals by 
prevailing parties could satisfy the Article III case or controversy 
30. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at2030-33. 
31. Id at 2031. 
32. See 1d at 2028. 
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requiremene3 This holding seems to have been motivated by Justice 
Kagan's desire to avoid an unintended consequence of the Saucierand 
Pearson decisions, which authorized lower courts to issue Fourth 
Amendment advisory opinions in qualified immunity cases. If 
prevailing parties were not permitted to seek review, those advisory 
opinions could be shielded from the Supreme Court in cases like 
Camreta, where the losing party chose not to appeal. It is also possible 
that Camreta's authorization of prevailing-party appeals was a 
compromise designed to secure the votes of Justices who were 
prepared to overrule Saucier and Pearson in order to prevent lower 
courts from being able to issue Fourth Amendment opinions that the 
Supreme Court would not have the ability to reverse. 34 
Justice Kagan, however, did go on to stress that Article III 
required both parties to retain a personal stake in the outcome 
throughout the course of the litigation. She stated that a party has such 
stake when that party has "'suffered an injury in fact' that is caused by 
'the conduct complained of' and that 'will be redressed by a favorable 
decision."'35 The language that Justice Kagan used to describe how 
both parties could retain the requisite Article III stake in the outcome is 
here reproduced in its entirety: 
This Article III standard often will be met when immunized officials 
seek to challenge a ruling that their conduct violated the Constitution. 
That is not because a court has made a retrospective judgment about the 
lawfulness of the officials' behavior, for that judgment is 
unaccompanied by any personal liability. Rather, it is because the 
judgment may have prospective effect on the parties. The court in such 
a case says: "Although this official is immune from damages today, 
what he did violates the Constitution and he or anyone else who does 
that thing again will be personally liable." If the official regularly 
engages in that conduct as part of his job (as Carnreta does), he suffers 
injury caused by the adverse constitutional ruling. So long as it 
continues in effect, he must either change the way he performs his 
duties or risk a meritorious damages action. Ci id [Deposit Guar. Nat'l 
Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980)], at 337-338, 100 S.Ct. 1166 
(discussing prevailing party's stake in a ruling's prospective effects). 
Only by overturning the ruling on appeal can the official gain clearance 
33. See id at 2028-29 (citing Deposit Guar. Nat'! Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332-
336 ( 1980); E1ec. Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 ( 1939)). 
34. Cf 1d at 2043 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (suggesting that lower court authorization 
to issue Fourth Amendment advisory opinions might have to be reconsidered); accord 1d at 
2036 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
35. Jd at 2028 (majority opinion) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560-61 (1992)). 
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to engage in the conduct in the future. He thus can demonstrate, as we 
demand, injury, causation, and redressability.4 And conversely, if the 
person who initially brought the suit may again be subject to the 
challenged conduct, she has a stake in preserving the court's holding. 
See Ede v. Pap's A.M, 529 U.S. 277, 287-289, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 
L.Ed.2d 265 (2000); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318-323, 108 S.Ct. 
592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988); cf. [Los Angeles v.] Lyons, 461 U.S. [95], 
at 111, 103 S.Ct. 1660 [(1983)] (examining whether the plaintiff had 
shown "a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a 
similar way"). Only if the ruling remains good law will she have 
ongoing protection from the practice.36 
There are three problems with Justice Kagan's Article III 
discussion. First, the desire of parties for prospective constitutional 
guidance standing alone is typically not sufficient to create an Article 
III case or controversy. Second, it is difficult to see how a party 
adversely affected by a lower court decision retains an Article III stake 
in the outcome of the decision if that party has chosen not to appeal. 
Third, Justice Kagan's Article III discussion was paradoxically part of 
an advisory opinion that the Camreta Court itself lacked Article III 
jurisdiction to issue. 
a. Prospective Guidance 
The advisory opinion prohibition of Article III does not seem to 
tolerate a party's bare request for prospective legal guidance. Just as 
the first Supreme Court famously declined to give requested legal 
advice to President George Washington in the absence of a live case or 
controversy,37 the Court cannot properly give legal advice to 
immunized officials concerning the Fourth Amendment validity of in-
school student searches in the absence of a live case or controversy. 
Justice Kagan's quoted language concedes that Carnreta and Alford 
ceased to possess a personal stake in Sarah's damage claim once that 
claim had been resolved in their favor by the Ninth Circuit's qualified 
36. Id at 2029. Footnote 4 stated, "Contrary to the dissent's view, the injury to the 
official thus occurs independent of any future suit brought by a third party. Indeed, no such 
suit is likely to arise because the prospect of damages liability will force the official to change 
his conduct." Id at 2029 n.4 (citation omitted). 
3 7. In 1793, Chief Justice John Jay's Supreme Court declined to answer a series of 
abstract international law questions posed by President Washington on the grounds that the 
Court was precluded from issuing what we now characterize as advisory opinions. See 
FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 50-54. The advisory opinion prohibition on federal 
jurisdiction has been repeatedly enforced ever since. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2037-38 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing advisory opinion cases); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95-96 
(1968); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1911). 
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immunity holding. Their only remaining interest, therefore, was in 
receiving prospective constitutional guidance concerning the validity 
of future in-school interviews that might be directed at future students. 
More specifically, they wanted the Supreme Court to free them from 
the prospective guidance that the Ninth Circuit had given them in 
holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibited in-school searches 
without adequate Fourth Amendment safeguards. But recognition of 
that interest poses a serious Article III problem. 
Assume that it were Congress rather than the Ninth Circuit that 
prohibited the future in-school interviews that Camreta and Alford 
wished to conduct. If Congress had passed a statute, pursuant to its 
Section 5 power under the Fourteenth Amendment, that was designed 
to implement the Fourth Amendment by preventing in-school 
interviews without adequate Fourth Amendment safeguards, Article III 
would not give a federal court jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of 
Congress's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment based solely on 
congressional enactment of the statute.38 Rather, a preenforcement 
challenge to the statute could be maintained only by filing an 
injunctive or declaratory judgment action against some particular 
student or class of students whom the officials planned imminently to 
interview in violation of the terms of the statute. Indeed, those 
stringent particularity and imminence requirements are imposed by the 
very Lyons decision that Justice Kagan cites in the quoted excerpt 
from her opinion. 
The desire of the officials to be free from the Ninth Circuit's 
Fourth Amendment ruling in the actual Camreta case seems vulnerable 
to precisely the same Article III problem. Just as Article III prohibited 
the officials from challenging a congressional interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment in the absence of a live controversy that existed 
between the officials and some particular student whom the officials 
wished imminently to interview, Article III also prohibits the officials 
from challenging a Ninth Circuit interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment in the absence of a live controversy that exists between 
the officials and some particular student whom the officials wish 
imminently to interview. But here there is no such student. The only 
particular student involved in the litigation is S.G., and the officials 
38. See Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 360. The Supreme Court has limited the Section 5 
remedial power of Congress to harms that the judiciary determines are produced by the 
violation of rights specified in or incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516-29 (1997); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598,619-28 (2000). 
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have expressed no desire to interview her again. Even if the officials 
were to announce a desire to interview S.G. or some other particular 
student in the future, that would not eliminate the Article III problem. 
Such an announcement might enable the officials to commence their 
own injunctive or declaratory judgment action against the identified 
student, in a way that presented an Article III case or controversy, 
provided that the Lyons imminence and particularity requirements 
were satisfied. However, it would have no bearing on the Article III 
validity of the Camreta appeal itself. The live dispute that had 
previously existed between Sarah and the officials terminated with the 
Ninth Circuit qualified immunity holding, and any future disputes that 
might occur between the officials and other hypothetical students had 
yet to arise.39 
It is true that federal courts do possess Article III jurisdiction to 
issue declaratory judgments.40 However, no declaratory judgment 
action was ever filed by the officials against the contemplated target of 
any future in-school sexual abuse interview. Moreover, even if the 
Camreta and Alford petitions for certiorari could be viewed as 
analogous to a complaint commencing such a declaratory judgment 
action, a federal court's declaratory judgment jurisdiction is still 
subject to the Article III case or controversy requirement.41 And once 
again, no ripe Article III case or controversy could exist in the absence 
of a particularly identified party before the court whom the officials 
sought imminently to interview. 
b. N onappealing Party 
Even if the desire to obtain prospective constitutional guidance 
could somehow be viewed as sufficient to give prevailing immunized 
officials an Article III stake in obtaining an advisory opinion, Justice 
Kagan emphasized that the other party-the nonprevailing party, 
whose damage claim was rejected in the court below-would also 
have to retain an Article III stake in the outcome. Sarah did, of course, 
possess a cognizable interest in the damage claim that she asserted in 
the Camreta litigation. However, that interest ceased to exist once 
Sarah chose not to appeal the Ninth Circuit denial of her damage claim 
to the Supreme Court. Indeed, the absence of an appeal by Sarah 
39. Justice Kennedy appears to make essentially the same point in his Camreta 
dissent. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2042-43 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
40. See Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2006)). 
41. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 325 (1936). 
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should have caused the Ninth Circuit denial of her damage claim to 
become final, and binding on all parties as the law of the case. Article 
III, therefore, permits Supreme Court review of the Ninth Circuit 
decision only if Sarah possesses some other interest that survived the 
unappealed denial of her damage claim. 
In determining whether some other such interest exists, it is worth 
noting that Sarah's decision not to appeal may well have been both 
deliberate and strategic. After having lost in the Ninth Circuit, Sarah 
may have chosen not to appeal precisely because she did not want to 
incur the risk of creating an adverse Supreme Court precedent. If that 
were the case, recognition of a continuing interest that Sarah possessed 
in Supreme Court review-an interest that would be diametrically 
opposed to Sarah's manifest interest in avoiding review-would permit 
the prevailing officials to foist upon Sarah an appeal that she had 
affirmatively chosen not to take. 
Because Sarah sued only for damages, she could not have 
possessed any cognizable interest in prospective relief that persisted 
after her damage claim had been denied. Indeed, no such interest was 
ever present in the Camreta litigation, because Sarah never sued for 
declaratory or injunctive relief. As a result, it seems that there are only 
two ways in which Sarah could possess an interest in Supreme Court 
review of the unappealed Ninth Circuit denial of her damage claim. It 
might be that some de facto desire to avoid future unconstitutional 
interviews of S.G. could give Sarah an Article III interest in Supreme 
Court review, even though Sarah had never asserted a claim for 
prospective relief in the litigation. Alternatively, it might be that an 
appeal by the prevailing immunized officials could somehow give 
Sarah a continuing prospective interest in the outcome that she would 
not have possessed in the absence of such an appeal. But neither 
theory seems plausible. 
It is unlikely that a de facto desire to avoid future unconstitutional 
interviews could give Sarah an Article III interest in Supreme Court 
review of the Ninth Circuit's Fourth Amendment ruling even though 
Sarah had never requested declaratory or injunctive relief in the course 
of the Camreta litigation. It is true that Article III now recognizes 
jurisdiction based on an "injury in fact," rather than on the narrower 
conception of a "legal right" that characterized earlier eras of 
justiciability jurisprudence.42 But the contemporary law of 
42. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2028 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)); cfTenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-
38 (1939) (establishing older "legal right" test). 
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justiciability is quite strenuous in its insistence that Article III demands 
highly particularized allegations and proof of injury, causation, and 
redressability.43 Accordingly, the Lyons case that Justice Kagan cites in 
the block quote reproduced above reversed an injunction affirmed by 
the court of appeals that barred excessive police force in the form of 
choke holds that were allegedly used in routine traffic stops and other 
nonthreatening situations.44 The Supreme Court reversed because 
Article III did not permit the suit to be maintained by a plaintiff who 
had been the victim of such a choke hold in the past and who feared 
the repeated use of such choke holds in the future. Although Article III 
permitted the plaintiff to sue for damages caused by his past choke 
hold injuries, it did not permit him to sue for prospective declaratory or 
injunctive relief, because he failed to establish a "real and immediate" 
threat of recurrence that was not "conjectural" or "hypothetical.'>45 Any 
prospective interest that Sarah had in avoiding a repeated 
unconstitutional interview of her daughter S.G. would certainly fall 
victim to the same fate. The fact that Sarah-unlike the plaintiff in 
Lyons-had never requested prospective relief means that there was 
never an occasion for her to allege or prove the threat of prospective 
injury that Lyons holds is required by Article III. As a result, even if an 
unarticulated prospective interest in avoiding unconstitutional 
interviews could constitute an "injury in fact," it would still be far less 
"real and immediate"-and far more "conjectural" and "hypothetic-
cal"-than the prospective interest found wanting for Article III 
purposes in Lyons. 
It is equally implausible that Sarah simply acquired a stake in 
Supreme Court review of the Ninth Circuit decision once the 
immunized officials were granted review. Normally, a respondent has 
a continuing stake in the outcome of an appeal because the respondent 
is defending a victory below. Here, however, the respondent had no 
victory to defend, so it is unclear how she could have any continuing 
stake in the outcome. As a formal matter, it cannot be that simply 
granting review to one party automatically gives the other party an 
Article III stake in the outcome of an appeal. That would 
tautologically collapse Justice Kagan's insistence that each party have a 
continuing stake in the outcome into a requirement that only one party 
have a continuing stake.46 As a substantive matter, the claim that one 
43. See Lllj"an, 504 U.S. at 559-62. 
44. See supra text accompanying note 36. 
45. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-13 (1983). 
46. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2028. 
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party's appeal automatically vests the other party with a stake in the 
outcome fares no better. There is an instrumental reason for the 
Article III requirement that both sides retain a personal stake in the 
outcome throughout the course of the litigation. As Justice Kagan 
stated, "[T]he opposing party also must have an ongoing interest in the 
dispute, so that the case features 'that concrete adverseness which 
sharpens the presentation of issues."><~7 "That concrete adverseness" 
seems unlikely to be present when a party both lacks any prospective 
stake in the outcome, and chooses not to appeal an adverse ruling 
below. 
In this regard, it is interesting to note that the transcript of the oral 
argument in Camreta includes an amusing colloquy between Chief 
Justice Roberts and Sarah's lawyer that seems to illustrate the 
"concrete adverseness" point. Wondering about Sarah's continuing 
interest in the litigation, Chief Justice Roberts asks, "[W]hy are you 
here?... You're not challenging the qualified immunity ruling? ... 
[W]hy didn't you just go away?" After the ensuing laughter died 
down, Sarah's lawyer responded, "S.G. does not have a legally 
cognizable stake, Your Honor. She won a moral victory when she 
obtained a ruling in her favor on the Fourth Amendment claim in the 
Ninth Circuit, but as this Court said in Hewitt v. Helms, a moral 
victory is no victory at all ... :><~s 
In light of this colloquy, it is also interesting to wonder what the 
Supreme Court would have done in Camreta if Sarah had elected not 
to participate in Supreme Court review of the Ninth Circuit decision, 
precisely because she did not view herself as retaining any prospective 
stake in the outcome of the case once her damage claim had been 
denied. In such an event, the Article III problem would have been 
presented in a way that was even more stark. However, past decisions 
reveal the Supreme Court might still have permitted review. The Court 
sometimes reviews a case on an issue, despite what would normally be 
viewed as a stark absence of Article III adverseness, by appointing an 
amicus curiae to support the challenged judgment below. The modem 
Court has done this twice every three Terms,49 and the current Court 
4 7. See id. (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at I 01 ). 
48. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 27-28, Ca.mreta, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (Nos. 09-
1454, 09-1478). 
49. See Brian P Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici 
Cunae To Deknd Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63 STAN. L. REv. 907, 909-10 (20 II). 
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did it in another case decided during the Camreta Term.50 More 
famously, the Court also did this in the 2012 Health Care litigation, 
appointing amici to argue severability and Anti-Injunction Act 
positions that none of the parties supported.51 In such cases the 
Supreme Court chooses to review the decision below, but it is able to 
do so only at the cost of imposing a serious strain on the concept of 
Article III jurisdiction. Likewise in Camreta, the Supreme Court 
authorized review of the decision below, but once again, it did so only 
at the cost of imposing a serious strain on Article III. 
c. Camreta Paradox 
Even if one assumes that the Supreme Court properly found the 
existence of Article III jurisdiction to review constitutional claims 
asserted by prevailing parties against opposing parties, in retrospective 
damage actions that the opposing parties chose not to appeal, the 
Supreme Court's decision in Camreta would still be paradoxical. 
Despite taking such pains to hold that it had Article III jurisdiction 
when both parties possessed a prospective stake in the outcome, the 
Supreme Court ultimately held that it lacked Article III jurisdiction to 
review the lower court's Fourth Amendment ruling in Camreta itself. 
Although Camreta retained a stake in the outcome, Sarah's claim had 
become moot. At the time of Supreme Court review, S.G. had moved 
from Oregon to Florida, was a few months away from her eighteenth 
birthday, and would soon graduate from high school. As a result, the 
Court concluded there was no realistic likelihood that S.G. would 
again be subject to an interview as a minor by Oregon public officials 
during a child sexual abuse investigation.52 
If that mootness determination was correct, the Supreme Court 
properly held that it lacked Article III jurisdiction to review the Ninth 
Circuit's Fourth Amendment decision. But if the case was moot, the 
Supreme Court also lacked Article III jurisdiction to issue that portion 
50. See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355,2361,2363-67 (2011) (appointing 
amicus to permit adjudication of private party's standing to raise Tenth Amendment claims of 
interference with state sovereignty, even though both parties conceded standing on appeal). 
51. See Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F. 3d 1235 (11th Cir. 
2011), cert.granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011); Dep'tofHealth&HumanServs., 132 S. Ct. 609 
(2011) (mem.) (appointing amicus curiae); Dep'tofHealth & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 609 
(2011) (mem.) (same). 
52. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2033-34. Unlike Camreta, Deputy Sheriff Alford 
ceased to possess a stake in the outcome. Because he was no longer serving as a law 
enforcement officer, he would not be involved in future child sexual abuse investigations. 
See id at 2034 n.9. 
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of the opm10n holding that it possessed jurisdiction to review 
constitutional claims by prevailing parties in more typical qualified 
immunity cases. The bulk of the Court's Camreta opinion was, 
therefore, a classic advisory opinion. It was issued despite the fact that 
it did nothing to resolve a live case or controversy. Paradoxically, the 
Camreta Court had issued an advisory opinion in the process of 
holding that it lacked jurisdiction to issue the very advisory opinion 
that it had just issued. 53 
Normally, when a case becomes moot on appeal, the Supreme 
Court dismisses the appeal and vacates the judgment below in 
accordance with the procedure specified in Umted States v. 
Munsingwear, Inc.54 Justice Kagan followed that procedure in 
dismissing the Ninth Circuit holding that the in-school interview of 
S.G. violated the Fourth Amendment. In freeing the officials from the 
prospective effect of the Ninth Circuit holding, Justice Kagan stated, 
"The equitable remedy of vacatur ensures that 'those who have been 
prevented from obtaining the review to which they are entitled [are] 
not ... treated as if there had been a review."'55 This prevented the 
Ninth Circuit interpretation of the Fourth Amendment from becoming 
final without the opportunity for Supreme Court review. But given 
that the Munsingwear mootness dismissal eliminated any prospective 
effect of the Ninth Circuit's Fourth Amendment ruling, the interesting 
question is why Justice Kagan saw the additional need to issue her 
advisory opinion holding that Article III permitted prevailing parties to 
obtain review of constitutional issues in qualified immunity cases. It 
appears that Justice Kagan was trying to solve a practical problem. 
As noted above, constitutional claims in qualified immunity 
cases might never be adjudicated if lower courts were not permitted to 
issue advisory opinions addressing those claims despite the existence 
53. Arguably, the holding in Camreta was merely anomalous, rather than truly 
paradoxical. The Supreme Court could have waited for a case that was not moot in which to 
announce its new prevailing-party review rule. However, no prevailing party was likely to 
seek review in a subsequent qualified immunity case. Prior to Camreta, such review would 
have been viewed as barred by the advisory opinion prohibition. It was only by authorizing 
prevailing-party review in the course of its Camreta mootness dismissal that the Court could 
realistically effectuate such review in future cases. The Court apparently did not want to 
waste the potentially unique opportunity presented by the unorthodox Camreta petition for 
review-a petition filed by a prevailing party in a case where the losing party had chosen not 
to appeal. In any event, the Fourth Amendment exposition that the Court has authorized in 
qualified immunity cases is truly paradoxical. 
54. 340 u.s. 36, 39-40 (1950). 
55. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2035 (alteration in original) (quoting Munsingwear, 
340 U.S. at 39). 
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of dispositive immunity defenses.56 Justice Kagan was acutely aware 
of this problem. 57 In cases like Camreta, where the losing party elected 
not to seek Supreme Court review, the lower court's potentially 
erroneous constitutional ruling would remain in effect without any 
opportunity for Supreme Court review. There would be no occasion 
for a Munsingwear dismissal on mootness grounds, because there 
would be no appeal to serve as the vehicle for a Munsingwear 
dismissal. 
Perhaps review could simply be exercised in the next case that 
presented the asserted constitutional claim. But the next case might 
not readily arise. Once the lower court ruled that the actions of the 
government official were unconstitutional, government officials would 
be unlikely to engage in the conduct at issue-even though the lower 
court decision might be an erroneous decision that was never reviewed 
by the Supreme Court. Officials would be directly precluded from 
doing so in the circuit that had issued the lower court decision, because 
the lower court decision would be the law of that circuit. Moreover, 
government officials in other circuits would likely also cease the 
practice, because they could no longer confidently rely on qualified 
immunity to protect them from damage claims. The lower court 
decision might render the supposed unconstitutionality of the practice 
"clearly established," thereby depriving officials of qualified immunity 
if they continued to engage in the practice. Accordingly, Justice Kagan 
issued her advisory opinion in order to solve this problem. Her 
advisory opinion held that prevailing parties would have the Article III 
ability to seek Supreme Court review in such situations, as a way of 
permitting review that might otherwise be unavailable. 58 
In balancing the practical need to provide a route for Supreme 
Court review against the constitutional need to remain within the 
confines of Article III jurisdiction, Justice Kagan favored the practical 
need. At least four other Justices, however, disagreed with her 
resolution of that conflict. Justice Sotomayor concurred in the 
judgment, in an opinion joined by Justice Breyer. She asserted that the 
Camreta case should simply be dismissed as moot, and the Fourth 
Amendment portion of the Ninth Circuit opinion that the prevailing 
officials sought to challenge should be vacated under Munsingwear.59 
Justice Kennedy dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Thomas. 
56. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
57. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2030-32. 
58. Seeid at2031-32. 
59. See 1d at 2036-37 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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Even after recognizing the practical problem that Justice Kagan was 
trying to solve, Justice Kennedy nevertheless concluded that Justice 
Kagan's opinion authorizing review by prevailing parties was an 
advisory opinion that exceeded the scope of the Court's constitutional 
jurisdiction under Article Ill.60 He also disputed Justice Kagan's 
suggestion that the Supreme Court had ever in the past granted review 
to prevailing parties.61 Justice Kennedy viewed the advisory opinion 
problem as being so serious that "the Court might find it necessary to 
reconsider its special permission that the Courts of Appeals may issue 
unnecessary merits determinations in qualified immunity cases with 
binding precedential effect."62 Although Justice Scalia concurred in 
Justice Kagan's opinion as one that "reasonably applies our precedents, 
strange though they may be," Justice Scalia was willing in an 
appropriate case to consider Justice Kennedy's suggestion that the 
Court "end the extraordinary practice of ruling upon constitutional 
questions unnecessarily when the defendant possesses qualified 
immunity."63 Accordingly, at least four-and possibly five-of the 
Justices on the Camreta Court appear to view Justice Kagan's opinion 
as an unconstitutional advisory opinion. 
Although constitutional limitations on the scope of federal court 
jurisdiction under Article III would seem to be fundamental, the 
various Camreta opinions reveal that reasonable minds can differ about 
the degree to which those limitations should give way to practical 
considerations concerning the need to provide prospective 
constitutional guidance to government officials. The availability of 
alternate routes for obtaining Supreme Court guidance would seem to 
be relevant to this issue, and Justice Kennedy argued, "Other dynamics 
permit the law of the Constitution to be elaborated within the 
conventional framework of a case or controversy.'>64 He suggested that, 
aside from qualified immunity cases, Supreme Court constitutional 
guidance could be provided in cases or controversies that arose out of 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment suppression challenges, defenses against 
criminal prosecutions, civil suits, cruel and unusual punishment 
claims, constitutional suits against municipalities (where qualified 
immunity is not available), suits against officials whose conduct was 
60. See id at 2037, 2040-43 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
61. See id at 2038-40. Justice Kagan responded that she was merely asserting that 
the Supreme Court had never stated that Article III was a bar to review by prevailing parties. 
See id at 2029 n.3 (majority opinion). 
62. Id at 2043 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
63. Id at 2036 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
64. Id at 2043 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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too extreme to warrant qualified immunity, and ripe preenforcement 
declaratory or injunctive actions that did not include claims for 
damages.65 
If Justice Kennedy's suggested alternative routes for obtaining 
Supreme Court review seem adequate, there was no pressing need for 
Justice Kagan to issue her prevailing-party advisory opinion. But even 
if Justice Kennedy's alternatives seem inadequate, it is important to 
remember that the absence of an opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
clarify the meaning of a constitutional provision is not necessarily a 
bad thing. The Supreme Court's own justiciability decisions have held 
that the absence of an Article III route to federal court adjudication of a 
constitutional issue may reflect the fact that the issue at stake is simply 
not suitable for judicial resolution, and should instead be resolved by 
the political branches of government consistent with our system of 
separated governmental powers.66 If the need for constitutional 
guidance can tolerate wholesale preclusion of review when necessary 
to satisfy Article III, it should also be able to tolerate the mere delay 
that would be occasioned by declining to authorize review at the 
request of prevailing parties in qualified immunity cases. 
There are also some seeming inconsistencies in Justice Kagan's 
opinion that might cause one to question the need for her advisory 
opinion authorizing review by prevailing parties. Justice Kennedy 
points out that Justice Kagan's advisory opinion permits prevailing 
immunized parties to seek Supreme Court review of adverse lower 
court constitutional rulings, but it does not authorize courts of appeals 
65. See id at 2043-44. Since Camreta was decided, several commentators have 
argued that considering the merits of constitutional claims in qualified immunity cases 
remains necessary for the orderly development of Fourth Amendment law. See, e.g., Orin S. 
Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v. 
Greene and Davis v. United States, 2010-2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237, 237-39, 245-48, 261 
(2011); Michael T. Kirkpatrick & Joshua Matz, Avoiding Pennanent Ljmbo: Qualified 
Immunity and the Elaboration of Constitutional Rights /Tom Saucier to Camreta (and 
Beyond), 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 643, 643-45, 656-69, 679 (2011); Sarah L. Lochner, 
Comment, Qualified lmmunJty, Constitutional Stagnation, and the Global War on Terror, 105 
Nw. U. L. REv. 829, 830-32, 859-64, 868 (2011); cf. Ted Sampsell-Janes & Jenna Yauch, 
Measuring Pearson in the Circuits, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 623,623-25 (2011) (finding lower 
courts continued to address Fourth Amendment claims in qualified immunity cases at the 
same rate, even when the Supreme Court no longer required them to do so). 
66. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442-43, 
1449 (20 11 ); Valley Forge Christian Coli. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 488-90 (1982); United States v. Richardson 418 U.S. 166, 179-80 (1974); 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1974); Ex parte 
Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 633-34 (1937) (per curiam); see also Spann, supra note I 0, at 637-38 
n.226. 
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to entertain such appeals by officials who prevailed in a district court.67 
Justice Kagan justifies this differential treatment by noting that district 
courts do not establish binding law for circuits in the way that courts of 
appeals do.68 However, if the point of Justice Kagan's Camreta opinion 
is to provide prospective judicial guidance so that government officials 
would not be chilled by potentially erroneous constitutional rulings 
issued by lower courts, it is not clear why that rationale would not also 
apply to the correction of potential district court errors by a court of 
appeals. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of court of appeals decisions end up being 
final under the Supreme Court's certiorari practice.69 Because the 
whole point is to prevent an official from having to wonder whether a 
constitutional rule has been "clearly established" for qualified 
immunity purposes, the technical binding effect of a lower court ruling 
would seem to be largely irrelevant. 
Justice Kagan's opinion also seems internally inconsistent in how 
it treats the concept of a continuing stake in the outcome. Justice 
Kagan emphasizes that both parties must have a personal stake in the 
outcome of a case in order to give the Supreme Court Article III 
jurisdiction to review the case.70 She then views Sarah's continuing 
stake in the Camreta litigation as sufficient to permit the Supreme 
Court to issue its prevailing-party advisory opinion, but not sufficient 
to permit the Court to issue a Fourth Amendment advisory opinion. 71 
Stated differently, if Sarah's stake in the outcome became moot enough 
to prevent the Court from addressing the Fourth Amendment issue, 
why was it not also moot enough to prevent the Court from addressing 
the prevailing-party issue? These are, of course, simply different ways 
of phrasing my basic point that Camreta's treatment of the advisory 
opinion prohibition was paradoxical. 72 However, focusing on the 
mootness aspect of the Court's decision is illuminating. 
It turns out that, in addition to asserting her Fourth Amendment 
claims against Carnreta and Alford, Sarah also asserted a Fourth 
67. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2043 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
68. See id at 2033 & n.7 (majority opinion). Justice Kagan's opinion expressly 
leaves open the question of whether courts of appeals could entertain appeals brought by 
prevailing immunized parties. Id at 2033. 
69. In its 2009 Term, the Supreme Court granted review in 0.9% of the certiorari 
petitions filed. See The Supreme Court, 2009 Term-The Statistics, 124 HARV. L. REv. 411, 
418 (2010). 
70. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2028. 
71. Compare id at 2029, with id at 2033-34. 
72. See supra Part II.A.3.c. 
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Amendment municipal liability claim against the county that 
employed Alford as a Deputy Sheriff. The district court, however, 
granted summary judgment for the county, and Sarah did not appeal 
that ruling. The municipal liability claim is relevant because Camreta 
argued that the existence of that claim prevented the Fourth 
Amendment issue from becoming moot. Carnreta argued that Sarah 
had a continuing interest in resolution of the Fourth Amendment issue 
because, if it were resolved in her favor, that would facilitate her ability 
to establish municipal liability against the county. 73 Justice Kagan 
rejected that argument, quoting Judge Posner's proposition: '"[O]ne 
can never be certain that findings made in a decision concluding one 
lawsuit will not some day ... control the outcome of another suit. But 
if that were enough to avoid mootness, no case would ever be moot."'74 
However, the very thing that prompted Justice Kagan to authorize 
prevailing-party appeals in her advisory opinion was the desire to "be 
certain" that "findings made in a decision concluding one lawsuit" 
would directly "control the outcome of another suit." She wanted 
proper resolution of the constitutional claim presented in a qualified 
immunity decision to control the outcome of future suits in which an 
official's conduct would be subject to the same constitutional claim. If 
Carnreta's interest in a ruling that would facilitate his defense to a 
constitutional claim in a future suit is sufficient to satisfy Article III, it 
is difficult to see why Sarah's interest in a ruling that would facilitate 
her assertion of a constitutional claim in the same suit should not also 
be sufficient to satisfy Article III. And if Sarah's interest had as much 
prospective utility as the interest of Carnreta that Justice Kagan found 
73. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2034. As Justice Kagan characterizes the procedural 
history, it is not clear why the district court denial of Sarah's municipal liability claim was not 
simply the law of the case. The court of appeals held that Sarah's failure to appeal the district 
court rejection of her municipal liability claim constituted a waiver of that claim. See Greene 
II, 588 F.3d 1011, 1020 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009). Justice Kagan's opinion states that Sarah's more 
recent request to have the claim reinstated was also denied by the district court on January 4, 
2011. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2034. That should have barred future efforts to assert the 
claim as res judicata. However, during oral argument in the Supreme Court, counsel for 
Camreta stated that Sarah's motion to reinstate the claim was being held in abeyance by the 
district court pending Supreme Court resolution of the case. See Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 7-8, Camreta, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (Nos. 09-1454, 09-1478). In addition, Sarah's brief in the 
Supreme Court stated that her Rule 60 motion to reinstate the municipal liability claim had 
been denied by the district court as premature, without prejudice to renewing that motion 
after the Supreme Court ruled. See Brief for Respondents at 32 n.20, Camreta, 131 S. Ct. 
2020 (Nos. 09-1454, 09-14 78). This would arguably avoid immediate res judicata problems 
by leaving the claim potentially alive, and potentially available to avoid a Supreme Court 
mootness determination. 
74. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2034 (alteration in original) (quoting Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Bd. ofTrade of Chi., 701 F.2d 653,656 (7th Cir. 1983)). 
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to be live, it is difficult to see why Sarah's interest should be viewed as 
moot.75 
In the process of holding Sarah's municipal liability damage 
claim moot, Justice Kagan notes that Sarah did not appeal the district 
court denial of that claim.76 But Sarah did not appeal the court of 
appeals denial of her damage claim against Camreta and Alford either. 
If Sarah's failure to appeal the district court rejection of her municipal 
liability claim was sufficiently final to make her claim against the 
county moot, why was not her failure to appeal the court of appeals 
rejection of her damage claim against Camreta and Alford sufficiently 
final to make her claim against Carnreta and Alford moot as well? 
It is true that Justice Kagan did vacate the appellate court's Fourth 
Amendment holding as moot, but that simply exacerbates the finality 
problem. After having dismissed the court of appeals Fourth 
Amendment claim as moot, Justice Kagan did not dismiss the court of 
appeals qualified immunity holding as moot--even though both 
holdings would seem to be equally final in light of Sarah's decision not 
to appeal. Moreover, Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in the judgment 
appears to agree with this bifurcated application of the mootness 
doctrine.77 Nevertheless, there does not seem to be any doctrinal basis 
for treating the finality of Sarah's failure to appeal differently with 
respect to the two courts of appeals holdings. 
One might be tempted to argue that the difference between the 
two courts of appeals holdings is that the prevailing parties appealed 
the Fourth Amendment holding, while no party appealed the qualified 
immunity holding. However, that argument ultimately seems circular. 
The very issue under consideration is whether Article III permits 
review by prevailing parties in qualified immunity cases. As a result, 
the suggestion that mootness is avoided because a prevailing party has 
appealed simply begs the question. In distinguishing between the 
Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity holdings for mootness 
purposes, it seems that the Supreme Court was merely motivated by a 
desire to authorize review by prevailing parties who seek prospective 
constitutional guidance. Achieving that objective would have been 
more awkward if the lower court qualified immunity holding were 
dismissed as moot. 
75. This problem reemerges in Umted States v. Juvem/e Male, 131 S. Ct. 2860 (2011) 
(per curiam), which is discussed in/Ta Part II.B. 
76. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2034. 
77. See id at 2036-37 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (favoring vacatur only of the 
portion of the lower court opinion officials sought to challenge). 
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As indicated above/8 one cannot help but notice that the interest 
of immunized government officials in obtaining prospective 
constitutional guidance that Justice Kagan finds sufficient for Article 
III purposes in Camreta would probably not be sufficient to satisfy 
Article III under Lyons if the officials were filing a declaratory or 
injunctive action of their own in a federal district court. That raises the 
possibility that Article III justiciability concerns apply with less force 
in the Supreme Court than they do in lower federal courts. To the best 
of my knowledge, the Supreme Court has never held this directly. 
However, the Supreme Court does sometimes behave as if this were 
true. In addition to issuing its advisory opinion in Camreta, the Court 
has held that it has Article III jurisdiction to review constitutional 
decisions of state courts even when the state court litigation did not 
present an Article III case or controversy.79 Moreover, Justice Kagan's 
willingness to permit prevailing-party review in the Supreme Court, 
even though it might not be permitted in courts of appeals, suggests 
that Article III might apply with greater force in the lower federal 
courts than it does in the Supreme Court.80 Although the idea that 
Article III might be sufficiently flexible to impose different demands 
on different federal courts is an intriguing one, it can claim little 
support from the text of Article 111.81 And to the extent that Article III 
is properly understood as serving separation of powers functions, 
separation of powers dangers are more likely to be present when the 
Supreme Court is adopting prospective constitutional rules than when 
lower courts are resolving disputes between the parties. 
It is difficult to square Justice Kagan's Camreta opinion with the 
traditional Article III prohibition on advisory opinions. The portion of 
the opinion that authorized prevailing parties in qualified immunity 
cases to seek Supreme Court review of lower court constitutional 
rulings seems to have violated Article III in two different respects. It 
constituted the issuance of an advisory opinion that was not necessary 
78. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45. 
79. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617-24 ( 1989); see also FALLON ET 
AL., supra note 12, at 1216-23. 
80. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2033. Justice Kagan does not address whether the 
different status presented by court of appeals review is rooted in Article III or prudential 
considerations. See id 
81. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The text of Article III does distinguish between 
"Cases" and "Controversies" in a way that could support a view that the various justiciability 
doctrines associated with Article III apply to "Controversies" but not to "Cases." See Spann, 
supra note 10, at 607 n.83. However, to the best of my knowledge, the Supreme Court has 
never distinguished between "Cases" and "Controversies" in articulating the scope of federal 
court jurisdiction. 
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to resolution of the dispute between the parties. And it constituted the 
issuance of an advisory opinion in a case that the Court held was moot. 
The Court appears to have permitted practical considerations related to 
the desire for prospective judicial guidance to override constitutional 
considerations related to the limitations on federal jurisdiction. 
Moreover, it did so in a case where the Court's sole motive seems to 
have been to facilitate the very provision of abstract constitutional 
exposition that the advisory opinion prohibition was designed to 
prevent. As it turns out, Camreta is not the only case in which the 
Supreme Court has made that trade-off. 
B. SeeAlso 
In one sense, the Camreta decision is unusual. Although it is 
doctrinally complex, its internal contradictions reside fairly close to the 
surface of the opinion. However, in another sense, the case is quite 
pedestrian. In fact, one need look no further than the last month of the 
same 2010 Term in which Camreta was decided to find that the Court 
often issues decisions that pose similar advisory opinion problems. 
In Ashcroft v. aJ-J(jdd, issued just five days after Camreta, the 
Court issued another advisory opinion under similar doctrinal 
circumstances.82 Al-Kidd sued Attorney General Ashcroft for 
damages, alleging that he was harshly detained for an extended period 
of time under a material witness warrant. He argued that he was 
arrested pursuant to the Attorney General's post-September 11, 2001, 
policy of making pretextual use of the federal material witness statute 
for the preventive detention of suspected terrorists whom the 
government had no intention of calling as witnesses but lacked 
evidence to arrest. Al-Kidd's allegation that this pretextual policy 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights survived a motion to dismiss in 
the district court. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of al-Kidd on both 
Fourth Amendment and immunity grounds, rejecting Ashcroft's 
qualified and absolute immunity claims.83 The Supreme Court 
reversed, finding no Fourth Amendment violation, and finding that 
Ashcroft was entitled to qualified irnmunity.84 
Al-Kldd is reminiscent of Camreta, but without the mootness or 
prevailing-party appeal complications. In al-Kldd, Justice Scalia's 
majority opinion resolved both the qualified immunity claim and the 
82. 131 s. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
83. See id at 2079-80. 
84. See id at 2083, 2085. 
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merits of the Fourth Amendment claim. One or the other of those 
holdings constituted an advisory opinion, because either standing 
alone was sufficient to resolve the dispute between the parties. 
Accordingly, three Justices argued that the Court should not have 
reached the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim.85 Interestingly, 
Justices Kennedy and Thomas did not adopt this position. They 
instead joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion,86 even though they had 
argued that the Camreta prevailing-party holding was an advisory 
opinion.87 Justice Kagan took no part in the decision, but to be 
consistent with her Camreta opinion, it seems that she would have had 
to join Justice Scalia's majority opinion in al-Kidd, rather than 
agreeing with the three other Justices typically identified as liberals in 
rejecting the propriety of issuing an advisory opinion resolving the 
merits of the Fourth Amendment claim.88 It is also interesting to note 
that Justice Scalia's al-Kidd majority opinion declined to address the 
rejection of Ashcroft's absolute immunity defense by the Ninth Circuit. 
Ironically, Justice Scalia emphasized that resolution of the absolute 
immunity issue was not necessary to the decision.89 
In Umted States v. Juvemle Male, a per curiam Supreme Court 
decision dismissed as moot an ex post facto challenge to a federal 
statute requiring sex offenders to register in any jurisdiction where the 
offender resides, is employed, or attends school.90 A juvenile convicted 
of sex offenses that occurred prior to enactment of the statute 
challenged a district court supervision order that included a 
registration requirement. The district court order was apparently based 
on an interim rule issued by the Attorney General, providing that the 
federal registration statute applied retroactively. The Ninth Circuit 
vacated the district court registration requirement, holding that 
retroactive application of the federal statute violated the Ex Post Facto 
Clause of the Constitution. However, the district court supervision 
order had expired when the juvenile turned twenty-one-prior to the 
Ninth Circuit decision-and the Supreme Court found an absence of 
85. See id at 2087 (Ginsburg, J., concurring, joined by Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ.); id 
at 2089-90 (Sotomayor, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.). 
86. See id at 2085 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
· 87. See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2037, 2040-43 (2011) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.). 
88. Note, however, that Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Kagan's advisory opinion in 
Camreta, see id at 2025-26, but objected to the Fourth Amendment advisory opinion in al-
Kidd See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2087 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
89. See al-Kldd, 131 S. Ct. at 2085. 
90. 131 S. Ct. 2860 (2011) (per curiam). 
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any continuing collateral consequences resulting from the order. As a 
result, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's ex post facto 
holding as moot, finding the lack of Article III jurisdiction.9' 
The Supreme Court purported to be preventing the issuance of an 
advisory opinion in Juvenile Male, but the Court's mootness 
determination seems curious in light of Camreta. The Juvemle Male 
Court found no continuing collateral consequences of the juvenile's 
registration order, but the actual continuing effects seem quite 
significant. Although the district court order expired when the juvenile 
became twenty-one, he was still required to register under both federal 
and Montana laws-unless, of course, retroactive application of those 
laws violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. This not only gave the juvenile 
a continuing stake in the outcome of his ex post facto claim, but the 
district court registration order seems specifically to have been based 
on acceptance of the Attorney General's interim rule providing for 
retroactive application of the federal statute.92 It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the Ninth Circuit's ex post facto holding was expressly 
addressed to the demands of the federal statute on which the district 
court relied in issuing its registration order.93 The desire to defend that 
holding on appeal would certainly seem like a sufficient stake in the 
outcome to prevent a mootness dismissal. The Supreme Court 
recognized this but stated that any ex post facto challenge to the 
federal statute had to be brought in a separate preenforcement 
challenge.94 Although the validity of the statute and the Attorney 
General's retroactive application rule seem fairly encompassed within 
the juvenile's ex post facto challenge to the district court order that 
interpreted them, the Supreme Court's mootness dismissal seems 
inconsistent with Camreta even if the Court is correct in requiring a 
separate preenforcement challenge. The Juvenile Male Court cites 
Camreta, and its quotation of Judge Posner's language, for the 
proposition that mootness in a particular case cannot be avoided by a 
desire for some prospective benefit in a future case.95 But as 
emphasized above,96 the desire to permit an advisory opinion issued in 
one case to govern the resolution of a constitutional issue in a 
subsequent case is precisely what prompted the Court to issue its 
91. See id at 2862-65. 
92. See 1d at 2862. 
93. See United States v. Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d 977, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009). 
94. See Juvenile Male, 131 S. Ct. at 2864-65. 
95. See 1d at 2864. 
96. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75. 
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prevailing-party advisory opinion in Camreta in the first place.97 And 
the Camreta Court declined to require the very same preenforcement 
challenge that the Juvenile Male Court insisted on. Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer and Sotomayor would have remanded the case so that the Ninth 
Circuit could consider whether the case was moot, and Justice Kagan 
did not participate.98 
In Turner v. Rogers, the Supreme Court issued another advisory 
opinion in a mootness case.99 There, the Supreme Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause did not automatically 
provide a right to counsel in civil contempt hearings that could result in 
incarceration for failure to make child support payments. 100 The case 
should have been moot by traditional standards, because the petitioner 
seeking counsel had already completed his twelve-month prison 
sentence, and there were no collateral consequences of his contempt 
citation to keep the case alive. However, the Court held that Article III 
permitted resolution of the right to counsel claim under an established 
mootness exception for cases that are "capable of repetition, yet 
evading review."101 Even though a twelve-month prison sentence might 
be long enough to permit some lower court determinations of a right to 
counsel claim, it is not long enough to permit full litigation through the 
Supreme Court. 102 Reminiscent of Camreta, therefore, the very 
existence of this mootness exception is to permit an opportunity for 
Supreme Court resolution of legal issues, even when resolution is not 
necessary to settle the dispute between the parties. 
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court issued 
alternative holdings in concluding that a large, nationwide class action 
alleging employment discrimination against women could not be 
maintained as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23.103 The Court held five-to-four that the commonality requirement of 
97. Although the Supreme Court chose not to address the ex post facto issue in 
Juvenile Male, it subsequently held in another case that the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act did not require pre-Act offenders to register until the Attorney General 
validly specified that it did. The Court then remanded the case for a determination of 
whether the Attorney General's interim regulations constituted such a valid specification. See 
Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 97 5 (20 12); see also Juvenile Male, 131 S. Ct. at 2862 
n.I. 
98. SeeJuvenileMale, 131 S.Ct.at2865. 
99. 131 s. Ct. 2507 (2011). 
100. See id. at 2512-13. 
I 0 I. See id. at 2514-15 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
I 02. See id.; see also 1d at 2521 n.l (Thomas J., dissenting). 
103. 131 S.Ct.2541 (2011). 
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Rule 23(a) had not been satisfied,104 and it held nine-to-zero that the 
back pay sought by the plaintiffs was not available in the Rule 23(b )(2) 
class action that the plaintiffs were seeking to maintain. 105 Because 
either one of those holdings would have been sufficient to resolve the 
dispute between the parties, the other holding was, once again, an 
advisory opinion. As was discussed above, 106 it may be justifiable for a 
lower court to issue alternative holdings in order to reduce the 
likelihood of reversal on appeal. However, the Supreme Court is not 
subject to reversal on appeal. As a result, alternative holdings at the 
Supreme Court level seem like classic advisory opinions, intended 
only to provide prospective legal guidance. Justice Ginsburg's dissent 
does point out that the plaintiff in the district court requested 
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) as an alternative to Rule 23(b)(2) 
certification.107 The Supreme Court's Rule 23(a) commonality 
advisory opinion might, therefore, seem efficient if it is viewed as 
providing dispositive guidance for any subsequent proceedings that 
might have occurred in the district court. However, that advisory 
opinion would still have been unnecessary if, as seems likely, the 
plaintiffs would have chosen not to pursue Rule 23(b)(3) certification 
in the district court. Perhaps that is why Justice Ginsburg went on to 
argue that the propriety of any Rule 23(b)(3) class action should have 
been resolved by the district court before being considered by the 
Supreme Court. 108 
In Bond v. United States, a unanimous Supreme Court issued an 
advisory opinion in a case where there was no continuing dispute 
between the parties-something that would normally preclude the 
existence of an Article III case or controversy.109 The case involved the 
conviction of a defendant who challenged the constitutionality of the 
federal criminal statute under which she was convicted. The statute 
prohibited the nonbenign use of toxic chemicals, and it was adopted in 
order to implement a chemical weapons treaty to which the United 
States was a party. However, the defendant argued that the statute 
exceeded the scope of congressional power under the Tenth 
104. See id at 2556-57; id at 2561-62 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, & Kagan, JJ.). 
105. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 (majority opinion); 1d at 2561-62,2567 (Ginsburg, 
J, concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.). 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23. 
I 07. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561 n.l (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
108. See 1d at 2561. 
109. 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011). 
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Amendment. The Third Circuit rejected the challenge, finding that 
individuals lack standing to complain about alleged Tenth Amendment 
federalism violations, because such violations harm states rather than 
individuals. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the defendant 
did have standing to assert the Tenth Amendment claim, and remanded 
for consideration of the merits of that claim.''0 
The Supreme Court holding was an advisory opinion because a 
lack of adverseness meant that there was no continuing dispute 
between the parties when the Supreme Court resolved the standing 
issue. The United States had initially contested the defendant's 
standing, but it had conceded standing by the time of Supreme Court 
review.''' This lack of adverseness would seem to have deprived the 
Court of Article III jurisdiction to determine whether individuals have 
standing to raise Tenth Amendment claims. The Court dealt with this 
problem pragmatically, by appointing an amicus curiae to argue in 
support of the Third Circuit decision under review.'' 2 But because a 
nonparty by definition has no judicially cognizable stake in the 
outcome of the particular dispute before the Court, the appointment of 
an amicus served to highlight rather than remedy the advisory opinion 
problem. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that it does 
possess jurisdiction to resolve confession-of-error and voluntary-
cessation cases. ''3 Moreover, the Court frequently appoints amici to 
"solve" advisory opinion problems in cases where there is no 
continuing dispute between the parties. One study has found that the 
Court does this twice every three Terms." 4 Rather than dismiss and 
vacate the lower court judgments in such cases, as is done after a 
mootness determination under the Munsingwear doctrine,"5 the 
Supreme Court presumably appoints amici precisely so that it can 
provide prospective judicial guidance to nonparties. In Bond, the 
Court provided immediate prospective guidance concerning who had 
standing to raise Tenth Amendment claims, rather than waiting for a 
case in which the issue was contested. If it turns out that the issue will 
110. See id at 2360-61. 
Ill. See id at 2361. 
112. See 1d The Supreme Court held that there was no Article III problem because the 
defendant's desire to overturn her conviction gave her a continuing stake in the outcome. 
However, the Court did not discuss the Article III problem posed by lack of adverseness. See 
1d at 2361-62. 
113. See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 58-62 (1968) (recognizing jurisdiction 
to resolve issue after confession of error); United States v. WT. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-
33 (1953) (recognizing voluntary cessation exception to mootness doctrine). 
114. See Goldman, supra note 49, at 909-10. 
115. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55. 
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never be contested, once again, the Supreme Court has held that 
Article III commits the issue to the political branches rather than the 
judiciary for resolution. 116 
In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court compounded the 
Camreta advisory opinion problem by apparently requiring the 
issuance of advisory opinions in order to permit the future 
development of Fourth Amendment law.117 Justice Alito's majority 
opinion in Davis expanded the good faith exception to the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule that the Court first recognized for 
police officers acting on invalid warrants in United States v. Leon. 118 
Davis held that evidence seized in violation of current Fourth 
Amendment law should not be suppressed in criminal trials if, at the 
time of the violation, then-binding precedent permitted the seizure.119 
Conceding that the new Fourth Amendment rule applied to the 
defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm under the Court's 
retroactivity precedents, Justice Alito concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment still did not require suppression. 120 After balancing the 
respective costs and benefits, he concluded that suppression was not 
compelled where the police officer who seized the firearm was acting 
in good faith, objectively reasonable compliance with then-binding 
Eleventh Circuit precedent. As a result, suppression of the evidence 
would serve no prospective deterrent function. 121 
Justice Breyer's dissent pointed out that the Court's new good 
faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was likely 
to ossify the future development of Fourth Amendment law, because 
defendants no longer had an incentive to raise novel Fourth 
Amendment claims once winning those claims ceased to result in the 
suppression of unconstitutionally seized evidence.122 Similar concerns 
prompted Justice Sotomayor to argue that the new good faith 
exception should not apply in cases where existing law is unsettled. 123 
116. See supra text accompanying note 66. It is worth noting that the United States 
conceded the existence of standing for the defendant to challenge the scope of congressional 
authority but did not concede the existence of standing to challenge federal interference with 
state sovereignty. Although the Supreme Court rejected this distinction, it does suggest that 
Tenth Amendment cases could arise in which the United States did not concede standing. 
See Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2365-67. 
II 7. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (20 II). 
118. 468 u.s. 897,913-25 (1984). 
119. 131 S.Ct.at2423-24. 
120. See 1d at 2425-26,2429-32. 
121. See id at 2426-29. 
122. See id at 2436-39 (Breyer, J. dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.). 
123. See id at 2433-36 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Justice Alita responded that there were still ways in which novel Fourth 
Amendment claims could make their way to the Supreme Court 
notwithstanding the new good faith exception.124 However, he did not 
suggest ways that seem more realistic than the alternate ways that 
Justice Kennedy's dissent proposed for presenting novel Fourth 
Amendment claims in Camreta. And the Camreta Court viewed those 
alternatives as insufficient to prevent ossification of the Fourth 
Amendment-thereby justifying advisory resolution of Fourth 
Amendment claims in the qualified immunity, prevailing-party appeals 
that Camreta authorized. 125 
There is a serious advisory opinion problem with the Davis 
decision. The defendant's Supreme Court brief in Davis succinctly 
crystalized the issue, arguing that prospective-only application of new 
Fourth Amendment law would amount to '"a regime of rule-creation 
by advisory opinion."'126 Moreover, the brief noted that criminal 
defendants might even lack Article III standing to assert novel Fourth 
Amendment claims if the good faith exception meant that prevailing 
on those claims would not redress the injuries that they sought to 
prevent through suppression of the unconstitutionally seized evidence 
that was presented to convict them. 127 The Davis decision may not 
itself be an advisory opinion, but it seems to create a situation in which 
future Fourth Amendment law can evolve on.ljrthrough the issuance of 
advisory opinions. The new good faith exception means that novel 
Fourth Amendment claims cannot have an effect on the outcome of the 
dispute between the parties. Qualified immunity precludes the 
development of Fourth Amendment law in damage actions--other 
than through the issuance of the advisory opinions authorized in 
Camreta. 128 And Lyons seems to preclude the development of Fourth 
Amendment law through prospective injunction or declaratory 
judgment actions. 129 Therefore, the only way that Fourth Amendment 
law can develop is at the hands of judges who are willing to include 
their musings about the Fourth Amendment in advisory opinions. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Leon expressly appears to have 
124. See id at 2433 (majority opinion). 
125. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65. The post-DaVIs ossification fear is 
stressed in Kerr, supra note 65, at 237-39, 248-61. 
126. See DaVIs, 131 S. Ct. at 2432 n.7 (quoting Brieffor Petitioner at 25, Davis, 131 S. 
Ct. 2419 (No. 09-11328)). 
127. Seeidat2434n.IO. 
128. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58. 
129. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45. 
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contemplated the issuance of such opinions.130 But it is, of course, 
precisely those advisory opinions that Article III says federal courts 
lack the jurisdiction to issue. 
The advisory opinion problem that permeates Camreta and other 
Supreme Court decisions is both pervasive and persistent. But despite 
the foundational nature of the Article III prohibition on advisory 
opinions, no one seems to be particularly troubled by the frequency of 
Supreme Court deviations from this constitutional limitation on federal 
court jurisdiction. The interesting question is why that should be so. 
Ill. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The classical model of judicial review is commonly traced to 
Chief Justice John Marshall's decision in Marbury v. Madison, which 
authorized the Supreme Court to invalidate acts of the coordinate 
branches of government only when necessary to resolve particular 
disputes between the parties. 131 However, the Court's use of advisory 
opinions to provide prospective constitutional guidance, in cases like 
Camreta and the other decisions described in Part II.B, is difficult to 
square with the Marbury model of adjudication. The Court's advisory 
opinion practice is, instead, more consistent with a model of 
adjudication that views the Court as a policy-making branch m a 
tricamerallegislative process. 
A. Marbury AcfjudicatkJn 
The Constitution does not explicitly authorize the Supreme Court 
to invalidate the acts of coordinate branches of the federal or state 
governments. Rather, John Marshall recognized the power of judicial 
review in Marbury only as a necessary incident to the judicial function 
of resolving disputes between the parties in a way that complied with 
the dictates of the Constitution. 132 In addition, Chief Justice John Jay's 
1793 COJTespondence of the Justices adopted a prohibition on 
advisory opinions, while declining to answer certain abstract questions 
about the law of nations propounded by President George 
Washington's administration. 133 Juxtaposing those two Supreme Court 
130. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924-25 (1984) (authorizing lower court 
advisory opinions to permit the continued development of Fourth Amendment law despite 
recognition of a good faith exception to warrant requirement). 
131. SeeS U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). 
132. See 1d at 176-80; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 72-73; Spann, supra 
note 10, at 589-90; Note, supra note 12, at 2064, 2068-69. 
133. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 50-54; Note, supra note 12, at 2066-67. 
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proclamations, the prohibition on advisory opinions is now understood 
to reflect the Marbury dispute-resolution model of adjudication.134 
The advisory opinion prohibition is rooted in separation of 
powers concerns. By limiting the constitutional exposition engaged in 
by federal courts to the resolution of Article III cases or controversies, 
the judiciary is less likely to intrude into the realm of legislative policy 
making.135 Accordingly, the Framers rejected the idea of creating a 
Council of Revision that would have permitted federal judges to rule 
on the constitutionality of proposed legislation, rejected the idea of 
having the Chief Justice serve on an advisory Privy Council to the 
President, and rejected the idea of authorizing the legislative and 
executive branches to compel legal opinions from the Supreme 
Court. 136 In addition to the advisory opinion prohibition--or, more 
precisely, as specific instantiations of the advisory opinion 
prohibition--other justiciability doctrines associated with the Article 
III case or controversy provision seek to limit the courts to dispute-
resolution activities. These include the doctrines of standing, ripeness, 
mootness, finality, the political question doctrine, and the prohibition 
on collusive suits.137 Similarly, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance 
precludes federal courts from unnecessarily expounding the meaning 
of the Constitution, if a dispute can be resolved without such 
exposition.138 In addition, the fact that courts invoke varying levels of 
scrutiny to govern the degree of deference that they will accord the 
representative branch actions presented to them further illustrates the 
importance of insulating legislative policy making from judicial 
interference.139 In fact, some claims will never satisfy the Article III 
justiciability requirements, thereby indicating that they have been 
allocated by the Constitution to the political policy-making process 
rather than the courts for resolution. 140 
In a representative democracy, the goal of limiting the federal 
judiciary to dispute resolution activities, rather than legislative policy-
134. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 72-73; Spann, supra note 10, at 589-90; 
Note, supra note 12, at 2064, 2068-69. 
135. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 72-73; Spann, supra note 10, at 632-36; 
Note, supra note 12, at 2068-69. 
136. See Spann, supra note 10, at 635. 
137. See id at 617-18; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 49, 72-73; Note, supra 
note 12, at 2064 n.2. 
138. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring); see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 76-80; Spann, supra note 10, at 591 
n.19; Note, supra note 12, at 2064,2079 n.64. 
139. See STONE ET AL., supra note 11, at489. 
140. See sources cited supra note 66. 
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making initiatives, is particularly important. The life tenure and salary 
protections accorded the unelected federal judiciary are designed to 
insulate the courts from political pressure in the resolution of 
disputes. 141 However, this political insulation reduces the institutional 
competence of the courts to engage in legislative policy-making 
activities precisely because the courts lack direct political 
accountability to any elected constituents. As a result, the Marbury 
dispute-resolution model's prohibition on advisory opinions is 
designed to minimize the countermajoritarian difficulties that would 
be posed by judicial policy making.142 
B. Tn'cameral Legislation 
The problem with the Marbury model of judicial review is, of 
course, that no one believes it. We are far more concerned with the 
prospective impact of Supreme Court decisions than with the manner 
in which they resolve the particular disputes before the Court. And we 
expect the Court to be an active participant in the resolution of public 
policy debates, rather than a passive umpire concerned only with the 
application of existing constitutional rules to claims asserted by the 
parties. It is, therefore, descriptively more accurate to conceptualize 
the Supreme Court as the third chamber of a tricameral legislative 
policy-making body than as a Marbury dispute-resolution tribunal. 
The Supreme Court has always been more concerned with the 
prospective effect of its decisions than with the retrospective resolution 
of particular disputes. Marbmy itself was replete with the resolution 
of legal issues-concerning who had what rights, and who was entitled 
to what remedies-that could only have prospective effect, because of 
the Marbury Court's own holding that it lacked jurisdiction to provide 
a remedy in the case before the Court. And Marbury did this in the 
process of establishing the prospective practice of judicial review.143 
One commentator has even argued that the Correspondence of the 
Justl'ces-which prospectively prohibited the issuance of advisory 
opinions-was itself advisory, because it did not arise out of a 
particular case or controversy.144 Moreover, the infamous decision in 
Dred Scott v. Sanford-arising out of a dispute that the Court, once 
141. See Spann, supra note 10, at 607-09. 
142. See STONE ET AL., supra note II, at 43-51; cf. Spann, supra note 10, at 605-06. 
143. See Spann, supra note 10, at 589-92. 
144. See Note, supra note 12, at 2067 n.l4. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the Court 
could have responded to the questions presented without issuing an abstract, prospective 
response. 
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again, held it lacked jurisdiction to resolve-was designed to have the 
prospective effect of protecting the institution of slavery and 
prohibiting black citizenship. 145 
In addition, some of the most famous contemporary Supreme 
Court decisions can only be understood as prescribing prospective 
legislative-type rules that were designed to regulate future conduct. 
Miranda v. Arizona required law enforcement officials to begin the 
well-known practice of reciting a statement of rights to criminal 
suspects in order to ensure that any subsequent confessions would be 
deemed voluntary.146 And Roe v. H1zde articulated the type of trimester 
rules for determining when future abortions could be regulated or 
prohibited that we would normally expect to be prescribed by a 
legislative body. 147 Moreover, recent cases like Camreta, al-Kidd, and 
Davis strained the Article III case or controversy restriction for the 
explicit purpose of providing prospective constitutional guidance that 
was unnecessary to the resolution of disputes before the Court.148 
Current Supreme Court practice also seems skewed in favor of 
prospective advisory guidance, with minimal attention being paid to 
retrospective dispute resolution. The factors that govern the Court's 
grant of certiorari focus heavily on splits between federal courts of 
appeals, inconsistent decisions between federal courts of appeals and 
state courts of last resort, and splits among state courts of last resort. 149 
Such concern with the clarification of federal law is perfectly 
understandable in the quest for prospective guidance, but it is largely 
irrelevant for dispute-resolution purposes.150 In addition, the questions 
and hypotheticals that the Justices pose during oral argument often 
seem more concerned with the prospective effect of various 
contemplated rulings than with the best way to resolve the disputes 
between the parties. 151 And the very existence of dicta, concurrences, 
dissents, and separate opinions-which by definition do not resolve 
disputes between the parties--can best be understood as efforts on the 
part of Justices to provide guidance on how to limit, expand, or 
145. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constjtutjonal amendment, U.S. 
CaNST. amend. XIV; see Spann, supra note 10, at 609. 
146. 384 U.S. 436,444-45 (1966). 
147. 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973). 
148. See supra Part II. 
149. See SUP. CT. R. 10. 
150. See Spann, supra note 10, at 613-17; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 72-
80. 
151. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-17, 19-24, 25-27, 33-48, 50-57, 
Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (Nos. 09-1454, 09-1478). 
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interpret the Court's present ruling in future cases. In fact, the practice 
of issuing published opinions at all seems designed to have primarily 
prospective effect. Disputes could be resolved by simple judgments, 
with any descriptive elaboration necessary to explain the court's 
reasoning distributed to the parties. Only the legitimacy thought to be 
provided by the doctrine of stare decisis requires publication, but the 
orientation of stare decisis is itself inherently prospective. 
As discussed above, the fact that the Supreme Court often 
appoints amici to argue cases where there is no longer a dispute 
between the parties further illustrates the prospective focus of the 
Court's attention.152 This prospective-guidance rationale also explains 
why the Court deems it advisable to review state court decisions 
resolving questions of federal law, even when those decisions do not 
satisfy the Article III requirements for federal jurisdiction that would 
apply if the case had been commenced in federal court. 153 And it 
explains why the Supreme Court sometimes issues alternative holdings 
even though its decisions are not subject to reversal on appeal. 154 The 
focus on prospective guidance further helps to explain the Court's 
practice of issuing rulings under the harmless error rule that it does not 
apply to the litigants themselves, and the Court's prospective 
announcement of new rules that are not applied to other cases pending 
at the time of the Court's decision.155 It also explains "hypothetical 
jurisdiction" cases in which the Court resolves the merits of cases 
rather than resolving more difficult threshold jurisdictional issues, as 
well as decisions in which the Court resolves federal constitutional 
issues despite the seeming existence of adequate and independent state 
grounds that would alone resolve the dispute between the parties.156 
This prospectivity focus even explains why the Court has sometimes 
gone so far as to resolve issues in uncertified "headless" class actions, 
despite the fact that they have become moot with respect to the named 
plaintiffs. 157 
In addition to expecting prospective guidance from the Supreme 
Court, we also expect the Court to be actively engaged in the 
resolution of social policy issues. In fact, landmark Supreme Court 
152. See supra text accompanying notes 114-115. 
15 3. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
154. See supra text accompanying notes 103-108; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 
12, at 55. 
155. SeeFALLONETAL.,supranote 12,at54-55. 
156. See id at 55-56; see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038-44 (1983) 
(discussing adequate and independent state grounds). 
157. See Spann, supra note 10, at 628-29 n.191. 
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decisions, such as those identified above, tend to be viewed as 
"landmark" precisely because they involved the Court in public policy 
debates. Dred Scott inserted the Supreme Court deeply into the pre-
Civil War slavery debate. 158 Miranda inserted the Court into the 
criminal justice law and order debate.' 59 Roe inserted the Court into 
the emerging feminist abortion rights debate. It has even been 
suggested that the Court declined to issue the requested advisory 
opinions in the Correspondence of the Justices in order to avoid taking 
sides in a political controversy that might undermine the desire of the 
Justices to be relieved of their obligation to ride circuit.160 And, of 
course, Marbwy itself grew out of an intensely political debate that 
was at its core about the degree to which judicial review could be used 
to retain partisan political power after a change in presidential 
administrations.'6 ' 
Our expectations of Supreme Court involvement in the public 
policy-making process are especially strong where controversial issues 
of social policy are at stake. Accordingly, Brown v. Board of 
Education162 was not so much about whether Linda Brown could attend 
a particular school in Topeka, Kansas, as it was about whether the 
practice of southern school segregation should be viewed as consistent 
with our mid-twentieth century conception of equal protection.'63 And 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission'64 was not so much 
about whether a particular film could be shown prior to a particular 
election, as it was about whether the twenty-first century First 
Amendment should be understood as permitting significant corporate 
influence over our electoral process. 165 It has become literally 
unthinkable that controversial social policy debates over issues such as 
affirmative action, school prayer, abortion, same-sex marriage, and 
now the health care mandate could be resolved without significant 
input from the Supreme Court. 
158. See STONE ET AL., supra note II, at 449-56. 
159. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-48 (I 966) (describing police 
practices). 
160. See JAY, supmnote 12, at 149-70; see also FALLON ET AL., supm note 12, at 52-53. 
161. See STONE ET AL., supra note II, at 36-43. 
162. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
163. See Spann, supra note 10, at 597-602. 
164. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
165. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The 'Vevastating" Decision, N.Y. REv. BOOKS (Feb. 
25, 20 I 0), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/201 0/feb/25/the-devastating-decision/; 
cf Roy A. Schotland, The Post-Citizens United Fantasy-Land, 20 CORNELL J.L. & Pus. 
POL'Y 753 (2011). 
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The Supreme Court's pervasive involvement in the formulation of 
prospective public policy suggests that the Court can be more usefully 
conceptualized as a legislative body than as a dispute-resolution 
tribunal. Rather than passively applying settled law to disputes 
between the parties, the Court actively adopts and refines 
governmental policies through the process of judicial review. 
Accordingly, I have previously argued that the Court should be viewed 
as the third branch of a tricameral legislature, because it makes 
legislative-type social policy in much the same way that the political 
branches of government do. The Court can be viewed as a third 
legislative chamber that exists in addition to the House and the Senate, 
or as a third policy-making branch of government that exists in 
addition to Congress and the President.166 Under either view of 
Supreme Court tricameralism, the important point is that the process 
of constitutional interpretation is so loosely constrained by textual 
language, original intent, and constitutional theory that the Court is 
required to make prospective policy determinations in order to give 
operative meaning to constitutional provisions. 167 
In fact, the policy-making latitude of the Supreme Court seems 
roughly analogous to the policy-making latitude of the political 
branches. Actions of the orthodox political branches are constrained 
by political forces that emanate from constituent desires, whose 
immediacy is mediated by the length of the term of office associated 
with each political branch. Actions of the Supreme Court are similarly 
constrained by political forces that emanate from the appointment and 
confirmation process, and are similarly mediated by the longer term of 
office associated with life tenure. That tends to make the Supreme 
Court responsive to durable political interest groups, who are primarily 
concerned with maintenance of the status quo, and who want their 
preferences to be enshrined in constitutional principles. This, in turn, 
dampens the effect of any redistributive efforts that might emerge from 
the conventional political branches. However, the Court is ultimately 
doing what it thinks will prospectively advance its vision of sound 
166. See Girardeau A. Spann, Constitutional Hypocrisy, 27 CON ST. COMMENTARY 557, 
561-64 (2011). Although the President is technically charged with the executive 
implementation of legislative policies, the demise of the nondelegation doctrine and the rise 
of the administrative state have given the President vast amounts of policy-making discretion 
that is more legislative than executive in nature. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 
U.S. 457, 472-76 (200 I) (recognizing permissive nondelegation doctrine); PETER L. STRAUSS 
ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMlNISTRATNE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 101-18 (rev. 
lOth ed. 2003) (discussing constitutionality of administrative state). 
167. See Spann, supra note 166, at 559-60. 
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social policy. And that is the very same activity in which the 
conventional political branches are engaged. 168 Accordingly, legislative 
policies cannot be adopted without the concurrence of all three 
chambers of our tricameral policy-making government-the House 
and Senate chamber, the presidential chamber, and the third 
prospective policy-making chamber that is lmown as the Supreme 
Court. 
The issuance of advisory opinions fits comfortably within this 
tricameral legislative model of judicial review. Like conventional 
legislation, advisory opinions are designed to implement prospectively 
the social policies that they embody. That is precisely what happens in 
Camreta-type situations, where advisory opinions in qualified 
immunity cases tell government officials how they are to behave in the 
future. Despite their legislative character, advisory opinions have also 
been provided to political leaders by individual Justices in the past, and 
several state and foreign courts are expressly authorized to issue 
advisory opinions in the present. 169 
Some commentators have suggested that a benign judicial 
function is the provision of advisory guidance to the political branches, 
precisely because that guidance will enhance the quality of legislative 
policy making. 170 Moreover, advisory opinions have been used to exert 
a more intrusive influence on the legislative process by threatening a 
judicial veto of unwanted actions favored by other political bodies, in 
much the same way that political vetoes are threatened by the House, 
Senate, and President when they seek to gain political leverage over 
proposed legislation. The Roberts Court provided a striking example 
of this sort of effort to gain political leverage over legislation in 
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, 
when the Court in advisory dicta strongly suggested that it would hold 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional if Congress did not 
act to modify its provisions.' 7' 
To make matters worse, the advisory opinion prohibition itself 
may be legislative in nature. Some economic models of the legislative 
process have suggested that even the refiisaf to issue advisory opinions 
can create constitutional uncertainty that ends up giving the Supreme 
Court more influence over the legislative process than it would have in 
168. Seeidat561-64. 
169. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 52-54, 58; JAY, supra note 12, at 1-112. 
170. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1709, 
1709-12 (1998). 
171. See 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009). 
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the absence of the advisory opinion prohibition.172 As a result, it seems 
that the Supreme Court is destined to act as a legislative policy-making 
body whether it issues advisory opinions or not. Because the 
separation-of-powers-based Marbwy model of adjudication is 
ultimately about preventing the Supreme Court from engaging in such 
legislative policy-making activities, the very coherence of judicial 
review is drawn into question by the prospective orientation of 
Supreme Court adjudication. 
IV. CONSTRUCTIVE INCOHERENCE 
The Marbwy model limits judicial review to the necessary 
incidents of retrospective dispute resolution. But what we actually 
want the Supreme Court to do is issue the sorts of prospective policy 
decisions that are more honestly captured by a legislative model of 
judicial review. An insistence that the Court simultaneously adhere to 
these two conflicting models renders our prevailing conception of 
judicial review incoherent. The question that naturally arises, 
therefore, is why we do not restore coherence by simply choosing one 
model over the other. I believe that we adhere to these conflicting 
models in the hope that, by doing so, we can transcend a dilemma 
inherent in liberalism itself-the simultaneous conception of ourselves 
as autonomous liberal individuals who pursue pluralist self-interest, 
and as other-regarding republican communitarians who pursue civic 
virtue. Supreme Court mediation offers an escape from the tension 
that exists between these two conflicting conceptions, by helping us to 
avoid accountability for the selfish ways in which we treat each other. 
However, recognition of the incoherence inherent in the demands that 
we place on a liberal conception of judicial review may actually 
promote accountability for our egocentric inclinations, and prompt us 
to treat each other in more empathetic ways. 
A. Liberal Dilemma 
Because we live together, rather than in isolation, each of us 
experiences a constant tension between our own self-interests and the 
conflicting interests of others. But because we are committed to 
liberalism, we seek to dissipate that tension in ways that will privilege 
individual liberty over collective welfare that could take the form of 
oppressive collective coercion. Social contract theory attempts to 
172. Note, supra note 12, at 2077-82. 
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resolve this liberal dilemma by positing the existence of a mutual 
agreement pursuant to which each of us relinquishes a limited portion 
of individual autonomy in exchange for a corresponding 
relinquishment of autonomy by other members of society. Thomas 
Hobbes theorized that this relinquishment of liberal autonomy to the 
sovereign grants the sovereign absolute power to protect us from the 
mutually destructive forces that we would inflict on each other in a 
state of nature, thereby enabling us to relate to each other safely and 
productively in civil society. 173 John Locke envisioned a more 
contingent nature of sovereign power. Because individuals agree to 
impose natural law norms on themselves as terms of the social contract 
into which they enter, he advanced a liberal conception of the 
sovereign as an entity that is ultimately subject to the authority of the 
contracting parties who have ceded the power necessary to create it.' 74 
Duncan Kennedy used the term "fundamental contradiction" to 
emphasize the internal, psychological dimension of the liberal 
dilemma. Not just social circumstances, but individual identity itself, 
is dependent on relationships with others-for example, employer, 
friend, spouse, father, sister, lover. That gives others the power to 
threaten not only an individual's material comfort, but to threaten an 
individual's sense of self as well. Accordingly, the liberal dilemma 
causes individuals both to seek out connections with others in order to 
make themselves feel materially secure and psychologically complete, 
and to reject connections with others in order to protect themselves 
from the dangers that others pose to an individual's material and 
psychological integrity. Individual autonomy is, therefore, ultimately 
vulnerable to the coercive power of others, including the collective 
coercive power on which Hobbes and Locke would rely to protect that 
autonomy. In order for this tension to be successfully mediated, there 
must be some reliable means of confining coercive social power to its 
proper sphere. We tend to rely on courts to mediate the tension by 
articulating doctrinal rules that offer liberal accounts of how social 
power can properly be cabined. But to the extent that liberal theory 
ends up simply masking hierarchical structures of social power, that 
are based on things like social class or genetic endowments, we remain 
mired in the liberal dilemma.175 
173. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tucked., 1996). 
174. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION 1-210 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003). 
175. See Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. 
REv. 205,211-13,216-21,256-72 (1979). Kennedy has since suggested that the fundamental 
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The tension between individual and collective interests that is 
highlighted by the liberal dilemma also lies beneath debates about the 
appropriate function of constitutional governance. Contemporary 
liberal theories of constitutional law privilege personal liberty and 
view the state as existing primarily to protect the rights of autonomous 
individuals. Accordingly, sound governmental policy results from the 
aggregation of individual preferences that emerge from the clash of 
special interest factions in the pluralist political process. Under this 
view, individual rights tend to be important as safeguards against 
redistributive initiatives of the state that would threaten existing 
property entitlements. 176 Classical republican theories of constitutional 
law echo anti-federalist arguments that resisted adoption of the 
Constitution. They are more communitarian than liberal in nature, and 
they view the state as existing primarily to facilitate public deliberation 
and the inculcation of civic virtue in citizens. Under this view, 
individual rights are secondary to the collective welfare, which can 
sometimes be advanced through redistributive efforts that promote 
equality among citizens.177 The Madisonian version of republicanism 
that ultimately provided the basic architecture of the Constitution was 
an effort to merge the practicalities of liberal pluralism with the 
benefits of classical republicanism. 178 However, Madisonian 
republicanism is itself sufficiently liberal that it remains vulnerable to 
the individual-collective tension that lies at the heart of the liberal 
dilemma. 
I think that we are, understandably, trying to have it both ways. 
We need to find some method of mediating the tension inherent in the 
liberal dilemma, so that we can feel secure in our belief that the state 
will protect us against the aggression of others but will not itself utilize 
coercive state power to harm us. And we also want the freedom to 
contradiction no longer serves a useful conceptual function, because it has become a reified 
abstraction. He fears that people now simply invoke the concept to serve their own purposes 
in philosophizing about law, thereby illustrating rather than negating its value as a caution 
against false mediation and a preoccupation with analytical truth. See Peter Gabel & Duncan 
Kennedy, Roll over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. I, 12-18, 24-25 (1984). My intent is to 
make affirmative use of the liberal dilemma reflected in the fundamental contradiction as a 
caution against the pursuit of analytical truth. But I suppose there is always the danger that I 
am further domesticating the power of the concept. 
176. SeeCass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L REv. 
1689, 1689-95 (1984); see also STONE ET AL., supra note II, at 19-21, 24-29. See generally 
STONE ET AL., supra note II, at 712-20 (discussing constitutional theory). 
177. See STONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 12-14; Sunstein, supra note 176, at 1689-95. 
See generally STONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 712-20 (discussing constitutional theory). 
178. See STONE ET AL., supra note II, at 19-21, 24-26; Sunstein, supra note 176, at 
1689-95. 
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pursue our individual self-interests in a liberal pluralist manner, while 
still thinking of ourselves as virtuous and other-regarding in a civic 
republican sense. Stated more succinctly, we want both to be 
compassionate citizens who are protected from the selfish aggression 
of others, and to be the selfish others who are inflicting that aggression 
on compassionate citizens. Needless to say, these conflicting 
preferences are difficult to reconcile. But we seem to be asking 
judicial review to reconcile them for us. 
B. Enhanced Accountability 
The Supreme Court's curious exercise of judicial review in 
Camreta can be understood as an effort to legitimate a liberal status 
quo by using the recognition of constitutional rights to mediate a 
particular incarnation of the liberal dilemma. Close examination 
reveals that the Court's effort is analytically inadequate to achieve this 
objective-an objective that, of course, is ultimately unattainable. But 
we have little incentive to engage in such close examination, precisely 
because of its destabilizing effect on the perceived coherence of 
judicial review. Nevertheless, a more mature appreciation of the 
incoherence inherent in our liberal conception of judicial review might 
cause us to accept more accountability for our individual and collective 
actions, which in turn might cause us to treat each other more 
empathetically. 
Sarah's nine-year-old daughter S.G. confronted a dilemma. 
Consistent with the terms of the Hobbesian-Lockean social contract, 
she favored state protection of her individual autonomy from the threat 
posed by adults who would subject her to sexual abuse. But she also 
wanted the state to refrain from overriding her autonomy in a way that 
would subject her to compelled governmental seizure against her will. 
More subtly, S.G. is also likely to have confronted the psychological 
dilemma highlighted by Kennedy's fundamental contradiction. She 
almost certainly experienced conflicting desires to be connected with a 
father whom she loved, and to be distanced from a father who 
threatened her with sexual abuse. To make matters worse, S.G. may 
have experienced additional conflicting emotions toward her mother, 
as someone with whom she wished to connect as a source of 
affectionate maternal security and to be distanced from as a force 
seeking to manipulate her in ways that were designed to protect her 
father from criminal prosecution. Liberal theory posits the existence 
of a coercive state whose selective intervention will adequately 
mediate these conflicting impulses. But if not properly mediated, these 
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conflicting desires for state intervention and state nonintervention will 
paralyze each other in a way that will be destabilizing for a liberal 
theory of the state. 
The existence of a Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures held out hope that Supreme Court 
enforcement of that constitutional right could perform the needed 
mediation function. By harmonizing S.G.'s competing interests in a 
way that authorized state intervention only to the extent necessary to 
protect S.G.'s autonomy-including her need for psychological 
serenity-the Fourth Amendment guarantee could transcend the liberal 
dilemma. Moreover, the imprecision inherent in the "reasonableness" 
standard of the Fourth Amendment could be overcome through the 
process of judicial review, where the Supreme Court could provide the 
constitutional guidance needed for proper application of the Fourth 
Amendment. Unfortunately, however, these are not tasks that judicial 
review can perform coherently. 
Leaving aside the difficult policy question of how the mere 
"reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment could tell the 
Court where to locate the proper crossover point between S.G.'s 
conflicting autonomy interests, the Court would still have to find some 
way to transmit its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment guarantee. 
Child welfare officials would need to know what level of state 
intervention was appropriate to protect S.G.'s autonomy, and 
individuals like S.G. would need to believe that their autonomy was 
being protected by the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Normally, the Court would do this by adjudicating 
claims of Fourth Amendment violations. If the state violated a Fourth 
Amendment right, the victim's autonomy could be protected with a 
compensatory damage award, and the Court's opinion would provide 
prospective guidance to others about the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. However, as the facts of Camreta show, that process will 
not work in cases where the Supreme Court changes its interpretation 
of where the Fourth Amendment crossover point is located-
something that the Court must do from time to time, in order to keep 
pace with our evolving cultural maturation. 
In novel Fourth Amendment cases, the Court would have to make 
qualified immunity available to officials who relied on the Court's 
prior interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. If the Court did notdo 
so, those officials would be deterred from engaging in the proper level 
of state intervention that was necessary to guard against child sexual 
abuse, which in turn would leave individual autonomy insufficiently 
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protected under the social contract. But once qualified immunity was 
recognized, two distinct autonomy problems would arise. First, an 
individual such as S.G. would have had his or her autonomy wrongly 
deprived by the state with no ability to recover damages to compensate 
for that deprivation. Second, from that point on, the Court would be 
disabled from engaging in future Fourth Amendment exposition, 
because Article III jurisdictional rules would preclude the Court from 
addressing the merits of the Fourth Amendment in cases that could 
thereafter be disposed of on qualified immunity grounds. As a result, 
Fourth Amendment evolution would be arrested, and the proper 
crossover point that established the evolving level of state intervention 
needed to protect individual autonomy could no longer be ascertained 
or transmitted. Therefore, the Court would no longer possess the 
ability to mediate the liberal dilemma, and individuals would be left 
fearing their return to a state of nature. 
The Camreta Court tried to avoid this result by modifying its 
Article III jurisdictional rules in a way that permitted the Court to 
provide prospective Fourth Amendment guidance through the issuance 
of advisory opinions in cases where qualified immunity applied, even 
on appeals by prevailing parties. But that strategy simply confounded 
the problem of establishing the proper crossover point by creating new 
liberal autonomy problems of its own. Just as the absence of qualified 
immunity would provide an incentive for state underintervention in the 
protection of individual autonomy, the presence of qualified immunity 
provides an incentive for state overintervention. Because officials will 
not have to compensate individuals whose autonomy is interfered with, 
the presence of qualified immunity is as likely to distort the Fourth 
Amendment crossover point in one direction as the absence of 
qualified immunity is to distort it in the other direction. But a more 
serious problem emerges once one recognizes that the Article III 
advisory opinion prohibition that the Court ignores in its quest to 
provide constitutional guidance in immunity cases is itself a rule that 
protects liberal autonomy. 
One justification for Article III restrictions on federal court 
jurisdiction lies in the recognition that judicial power is itself a form of 
state power that can interfere with individual autonomy. Like the 
Fourth Amendment, therefore, Article III jurisdictional rules also 
establish a crossover point that is needed to harmonize the conflicting 
needs of individuals to invoke judicial protection against incursions on 
their autonomy by other individuals and to avoid incursions on their 
autonomy by the judiciary itself. As a result, the advisory opinions 
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that are necessary for the Fourth Amendment to establish the 
appropriate liberal autonomy crossover point preclude Article III from 
establishing the appropriate liberal autonomy crossover point. And 
vice versa. Because the Court cannot both issue and refuse to issue 
advisory opinions in the same case, it is once again difficult to see how 
it could ever ascertain or transmit the level of state intervention that is 
necessary to mediate the liberal dilemma. Undaunted, however, the 
Camreta Court nevertheless attempted to do precisely that. 
Although the Court was willing to authorize the issuance of 
advisory opinions when needed to establish the proper Fourth 
Amendment autonomy crossover point, it refused to issue a Fourth 
Amendment advisory opinion in the Camreta case itself. That was 
because the doctrine of mootness dictated that withholding a Fourth 
Amendment advisory opinion was necessary to establish the proper 
Article III autonomy crossover point. If this is to make any sense, it 
must be because the issuance of some advisory opinions is necessary 
to achieve the proper level of state intervention, while a prohibition on 
other advisory opinions is necessary to achieve the proper level of state 
intervention. But it is unclear how the Court could ever distinguish 
between the two. The case or controversy provision of Article III does 
not by its terms distinguish between different types of advisory 
opinions-in fact, Article III does not mention advisory opinions at all. 
And any effort to invoke a liberal theory of the state to distinguish 
between mandatory and prohibited advisory opinions seems doomed 
to fail. If the Court were to hold some individuals entitled to more 
judicial protection of their autonomy than others-even though all 
were involved in cases where advisory opinions were equally 
unnecessary to the Court's decision-the Court would be 
discriminating against similarly situated individuals in seeming 
violation of the equality principle that is central to liberal theory. 
As has been shown, the issuance of Fourth Amendment advisory 
opinions is necessary to establish the level of state intervention 
required to protect individual autonomy, but the Article III prohibition 
on advisory opinions is also necessary to establish the level of state 
intervention required to protect individual autonomy. That makes 
Supreme Court efforts to mediate the liberal dilemma through judicial 
review unlikely to be successful. But things get even more 
complicated once one realizes that individual autonomy is a two-sided 
coin. Because autonomy claims are necessarily asserted in a social 
context, protecting one person's individual autonomy will often leave 
another person's competing autonomy unprotected. 
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For example, in Camreta, the autonomy of the child welfare 
officials was advanced by immunizing them from damage awards, and 
by authorizing them to receive advisory guidance that would help them 
perform their jobs more effectively. But those autonomy benefits to 
the officials were obtained at the cost of S.G.'s own autonomy. S.G. 
was unable to obtain damages for what the court of appeals held to be 
a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. Moreover, because the 
Supreme Court permitted the officials to appeal as prevailing parties, 
S.G. was even deprived of the declaratory victory she won in the court 
of appeals. Ironically, therefore, the autonomy of the child welfare 
officials was preserved by denying the autonomy of the child whose 
welfare was supposed to be protected. That not only illustrates a zero-
sum problem posed by competing demands for autonomy, it suggests 
the existence of a problem inherent in liberal theory itself. 
The autonomy benefits that Camreta granted to the child welfare 
officials were not personal benefits. Rather, they were benefits that 
the Supreme Court thought would make it easier for the child welfare 
officials to do their jobs effectively. Although S.G.'s own autonomy 
may have been denied, the Court presumably thought that its ruling 
would advance the goal of protecting aggregate child welfare 
autonomy in the future. Even in cases where the Court resolves 
competing claims of purely private autonomy that do not involve 
government officials, the Court presumably resolves the competing 
claims in a way that it thinks will prospectively best protect aggregate 
autonomy. But that begins to sound more like utilitarianism than like 
standard liberal theory. Without getting embroiled in a debate about 
whether liberalism and utilitarianism should ultimately be viewed as 
resting on the same moral foundation, this observation does highlight a 
tension present in liberal theory that has ramifications for judicial 
review. 
In mediating disputes, the Supreme Court acts as an arm of the 
state. And a properly functioning liberal state has no interest in doing 
anything other than protecting the individual autonomy of its citizens. 
But competing autonomy claims of individuals will necessarily 
generate conflict. And resolution of that conflict is the whole 
justification for the state's existence under social contract theory in the 
first place. Therefore, state interference with the autonomy of one 
individual can always be justified by its corresponding protection of 
the autonomy of another individual. As a result, judicial review can be 
characterized as either always serving its liberal function of protecting 
individual autonomy, or as never serving its liberal function of 
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protecting individual autonomy. Once we realize this, the Court can 
never successfully mediate the liberal dilemma in a way that saves the 
coherence of a liberal conception of the state. It is not simply that the 
appropriate level of state intervention to protect liberal autonomy is 
overdetermined. It is that the appropriate level of state intervention to 
protect liberal autonomy cannot be determined at all-because it does 
not exist No level of state intervention can adequately protect liberal 
autonomy, because the liberal dilemma is so fundamental that it simply 
cannot be mediated. 
All of this suggests that we should by now have recognized the 
incoherence entailed in a liberal conception of judicial review, which 
depicts the Supreme Court as simply a retrospective dispute-resolution 
tribunal that is unconcerned with the prospective formulation of 
legislative social policy. However, we continue to adhere to the 
Marbury model despite the problems embedded in its liberal 
foundations. I believe that we do so because judicial review helps to 
mediate yet another destabilizing aspect of the liberal dilemma that we 
would like to avoid. Just as judicial review helps us to suppress the 
realization that we are both dependent on and threatened by the state in 
our quest for individual autonomy, judicial review helps us to suppress 
the realization that we are both perpetrators and victims in the state's 
regulation of that autonomy. 
We seem to be ambivalent about the political theory that we wish 
to have embodied in our Constitution. We sometimes view ourselves 
as pluralists who treat the Constitution as a document that is designed 
to facilitate the formulation of democratic policy through the 
aggregation of self-interested preferences in the political process. And 
we sometimes view ourselves as other-regarding members of a 
political community who treat the Constitution as a document that is 
designed to facilitate the inculcation of republican civic virtue through 
a collective deliberative process. Just as we rely on judicial review to 
mediate the tension that exists between our conflicting autonomy 
preferences, we also rely on judicial review to mediate the tension 
between our conflicting liberal and communitarian inclinations. And 
once again, we have an incentive to believe that judicial review can 
serve this function, even in the face of its familiar coherence problems. 
Realistically, we treat the Supreme Court as if it were a political 
branch of a tricameral legislative policy-making body. We select 
Justices based on their political and ideological beliefs. We focus on 
their party memberships, religious affiliations, and abortion 
sympathies during the nomination process. We float stories about their 
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private club memberships and alleged sexual indiscretions during the 
confirmation process. We attend to their prior opinions to ascertain the 
planks in their political platforms, and we monitor the speeches and 
campaign promises that they make-or withhold-in the hope of 
winning election in the Senate. 
Once confirmed, we try to influence a majority of the Justices to 
vote in our favor by pitching arguments in our briefs that are designed 
to appeal to their perceived political and ideological leanings. We then 
form political coalitions to lobby the Court through the coordinated 
submission of amicus briefs by special interest groups. We make oral 
arguments that consist of carefully rehearsed talking points that were 
previously vetted before coalition partners in moot court arguments. 
When we win our cases, we praise the Court for reading the 
Constitution in a manner that corresponds to our own ideological 
preferences. And when we lose, we chastise the Court in our State of 
the Union messages for overruling a century of constitutional 
precedent. 
With the arguable exception of direct campaign contributions, we 
seem to treat the Supreme Court in the same way that we treat the 
other political branches of government. We treat it as an institution 
that should adopt our views, not because those views will advance our 
collective welfare, but because those views will advance our own self-
interests in the ongoing struggle for dominance in the pluralist political 
process. Such behavior is classically liberal, in that it satisfies the 
selfish urge to place our own welfare above the collective welfare of 
others. But this aspect of liberalism is not very pretty. 
A competing civic republican vision of social policy making 
seems to have more normative appeal. It posits the existence of a 
Supreme Court that is more concerned with collective welfare than 
with the bare aggregation of self-serving preferences. Under a civic 
republican view, social policies emanate from the pursuit of civic 
virtue rather than the pursuit of self-interest. As a result, the vision of 
democracy encompassed by civic republicanism is other-regarding. Its 
hope is to foster interdependence rather than liberal isolation. To that 
end, it seeks to promote conditions of widespread education and 
general economic security that will facilitate the common acquisition 
of civic virtue. 179 Robin West has argued that contemporary liberal 
legal theory seems affirmatively to have excluded empathy for others 
179. Seesupmtext accompanying notes 177-178. 
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as a permissible consideration when pursuing the rule of law. 180 In a 
civic republican society, however, individuals are characterized more 
by their capacity for empathy than by their willingness to marginalize 
the welfare of others in the name of objective legal liberalism. This 
aspect of republicanism seems prettier. But, it also seems more 
aspirational than realistic. 
I think that we cling to the Marbury dispute-resolution model of 
judicial review-despite the prospective legislative policy-making 
function that we obviously desire the Supreme Court to serve-
because the Marburymodel helps us to hide from ourselves the degree 
to which we are simply liberal pluralists. The Madisonian 
Republicanism around which our Constitution is structured embodies 
a compromise between classical liberalism and communitarianism that 
is helpful in this endeavor. It allows us to treat the Court politically as 
the legislative policy-making body that it is, but by having the Court 
insist that it is merely resolving retrospective disputes between the 
parties, we can believe that our political victories are actually victories 
of constitutional principle. This allows us to think well of ourselves, 
because we have contributed to the maintenance of our constitutional 
order. It also allows us to dismiss even the empathetic appeal of 
claims asserted by our opponents as themselves entailing nothing more 
than demands for self-interested political concessions. We can dismiss 
those competing claims precisely because the Supreme Court has 
assured us that they are not rooted in constitutional principle. That, in 
turn, allows us to exploit the interests of others for our own advantage 
in a way that we might be reluctant to do without the assurance that we 
were doing something more noble than merely advancing our own 
self-interests. Accordingly, things like the maldistribution of wealth, or 
the unequal distribution of resources over categories such as race, 
religion, gender, and sexual orientation, bother us less than they would 
without the buffer of Supreme Court constitutional legitimation. 
Under the Marbury model, we are able to use judicial review to 
mediate the liberal dilemma in a way that hides from us not only the 
dark side of liberal autonomy, but the dark side of human personality 
as well. 
The reason I view the largely technical Supreme Court decision 
in Camreta as important is that its reasoning forces the incoherence 
inherent in judicial review to rise to the surface. Because the Court 
180. See Robin West, The Ant1~Empathic Tum (Georgetown Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory, Research Paper No. 11-97, 2011), avaJlable at http://papers.ssm.com/sol/3/papers. 
cfrn?abstract_id= 1885079. 
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strains so hard to honor the dispute-resolution model, while 
simultaneously inventing new ways to circumvent it, the duplicity of 
that model becomes easier to recognize than to deny. If we can no 
longer hide behind the institution of judicial review to mask the degree 
to which we are willing to do unpleasant things to each other, my hope 
is that we will begin to resist the lure of liberalism. By focusing more 
on our collective welfare than our individual preferences, we may 
arrive at a postliberal stage of evolution in which we can begin to treat 
each other with less hostility and more empathy. In that way, the 
incoherence inherent in judicial review can turn out to be a form of 
constructive incoherence that prompts us to question the appeal of 
liberal theory itself. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court decision in Camreta is paradoxical. The 
Court issues an advisory opinion authorizing itself to engage in the 
formulation of prospective Fourth Amendment constitutional policy 
that is not necessary to resolution of the dispute between the parties in 
qualified immunity cases. But the Court goes on to hold that, because 
the Camreta dispute between the parties has become moot, the Court 
lacks Article III jurisdiction to issue an advisory opinion formulating 
Fourth Amendment constitutional policy in that particular case. 
However, if the Court lacked jurisdiction to issue an advisory opinion 
resolving the Fourth Amendment issue in Camreta, it also lacked 
jurisdiction to issue an advisory opinion authorizing itself to issue 
advisory opinions in other cases. 
The Camreta paradox is symptomatic of the incoherence that is 
embedded in our conception of judicial review. We want the Supreme 
Court to provide us with prospective constitutional guidance, but we 
insist that the Court do so in the guise of retrospective adjudication that 
merely resolves disputes between the parties. Because it is difficult to 
imagine that the Court could depart from the traditional Marbury 
dispute-resolution model of judicial review without also crossing the 
line into legislative policy making, we are further insisting that the 
Supreme Court pose the precise separation of powers danger that the 
Marbury model of judicial review was designed to guard against. 
The inconsistent demands that we place on judicial review reflect 
a dilemma inherent in liberal theory. We want the state to protect 
individual autonomy without itself interfering with that autonomy, but 
in addition, we secretly want the state to help us deny the autonomy of 
others in order to advance our own self-interests. In the process, we 
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also want the Court to portray our pluralist political policy preferences 
as if they were the products of our civic republican constitutional 
principles. Our desire to have judicial review serve these inconsistent 
functions is what makes judicial review incoherent, but the Marbury 
model helps us to mask that incoherence from ourselves. I believe that 
the Camreta paradox ought to be viewed as an opportunity to 
highlight, rather than suppress, the incoherence of our prevailing 
conception of judicial review. By confronting directly the manner in 
which we often sacrifice the interest of those unlike ourselves in order 
to advance parochial interests of our own, we may end up treating each 
other with less harshness and more empathy. The danger is that we 
will resist such self-revelation precisely because we are unwilling to 
inhibit our continued ability to engage in the sorts of exploitation to 
which we have grown accustomed-because we are inescapably 
liberal. If that is the case, I am not sure how we could ever escape the 
incoherence of judicial review. Alas, we would actually have to be the 
civically virtuous, empathetic people that we now seem capable of 
only pretending to be. 
